John Tamny argues that U.S. leadership in artificial intelligence depends on attracting skilled workers from around the world, particularly from China, and cannot be secured through restrictions on foreign talent. He disputes JD Vance's characterization of Microsoft’s foreign hiring, noting that its H-1B filings represented a small share of its workforce and citing Carnegie China research showing substantial net migration of elite AI researchers to the United States. The column says China is producing a growing share of top AI talent and retaining more of its researchers, while U.S. restrictions on foreign AI workers risk narrowing the talent advantage that has helped the country lead. Tamny concludes that the United States cannot win the competition for superintelligence without global talent.

Curtis Hill supports a lawsuit by 17 Republican attorneys general challenging California’s Senate Bill 54, arguing that its packaging requirements and fees would reshape national supply chains and impose costs on businesses and consumers beyond California. He says the state is using its market size to export policy, including through fees administered by the private Circular Action Alliance. Drawing on earlier multistate challenges to California and Massachusetts policies, Hill argues that states may pursue their own environmental goals but cannot compel nationwide compliance. He urges other states and business leaders to support coordinated legal action to defend state authority and federalism.

A global sulfur shortage, driven by disrupted shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, Russian supply constraints, and Chinese export restrictions, is squeezing production of phosphate fertilizers used for major U.S. crops. The author argues that food security, national security, and fair competition are related but distinct policy challenges, and should not be addressed with a single trade remedy. He recommends maintaining adequate sulfur availability for U.S. producers through stockpiles, diversified and reliable suppliers, and competitive domestic production, while noting that U.S. refining and natural gas processing generate most of the sulfur the country needs. Expanding domestic energy and fertilizer capacity could strengthen long-term resilience, though exports, permitting delays, and market logistics also shape domestic availability.

NVIDIA illustrates how technology developed for one purpose can gain much broader economic importance when social needs change. GPUs first served gaming and graphics, then CUDA expanded their use into research and deep learning, and rising AI demand shifted NVIDIA's business toward data centers. The article connects that pattern to Amazon's development of AWS from internal infrastructure needs and Shopify's support for online merchant sales during COVID-19. U.S. data on e-commerce, delivery employment, remote work, and faster-payment demand reinforces the broader sequence: social change creates new demand, companies respond, and investment can turn that demand into lasting industry and economic shifts.

Barry Ritholtz says investors cannot know when the bull market will end, but can take prudent steps now. The page does not provide the five steps themselves; it directs readers to the full article.

Defense startups are increasingly attracting investment from governments, banks, development institutions and established defense contractors, alongside traditional venture capital. The article cites NATO’s €1 billion-plus Innovation Fund, Canada’s $500 million defense fund allocation, JPMorgan’s security initiative, European corporate commitments and record U.S. defense-industry venture investment. Companies including Hadrian, Castelion, Covenant and Saronic are receiving substantial funding and, in some cases, major procurement orders. This blended public-private financing is reshaping how defense innovation and production capacity are funded, although it remains uncertain whether manufacturing can expand quickly enough to match investment.

Public opposition, permitting delays, power constraints, and rising electricity demand are making terrestrial data centers harder to build, while AI is expected to drive a sharp increase in computing needs. Space-based data centers could help meet that demand, though they face substantial challenges in maintenance, reliability, and heat dissipation. The article argues that improved launch access and spacecraft technology may make orbital computing economically viable, while research could also advance autonomy, power systems, communications, and resilient electronics. Those capabilities could later support lunar operations through shared computing infrastructure serving rovers, mining equipment, and other systems.

John Tamny argues that government spending harms people in the present, rather than shifting its main burden to future generations through public debt. He says lockdowns, wars, and other government programs consume wealth and resources, reducing investment, business activity, productivity, and economic opportunity. Rejecting Les Rubin's deficit-hawk argument and James Buchanan's claim about debt burdens falling on future generations, Tamny contends that borrowing may leave later generations with debt to repay, but the more immediate damage comes from government directing and consuming resources.

Arizona's expanding economic relationship with Taiwan, including Gudeng's new Glendale facility and a Taiwanese economic office in Phoenix, has drawn warnings from China about political ties. The article argues that the United States should welcome Taiwanese semiconductor investment rather than let diplomatic pressure deter it. Investment by TSMC, Gudeng, Quanta Computer and Wistron can diversify production, ease supply constraints, and reduce dependence on individual suppliers or regions. Taiwanese firms also bring experienced engineers, proprietary technology and production expertise, while partnerships with Arizona State University and Cadence Design support research and chip innovation. The author concludes that these investments can strengthen American manufacturing and supply-chain resilience.

Microsoft cut engineers’ monthly AI spending allowances from $100,000 to $10,000 and has also reduced internal spending on Claude. The cuts may reflect cost discipline, but they do not show whether fewer tokens will preserve productivity or whether prior consumption was wasteful. Winton Woods argues that AI’s economic value cannot be inferred from spending figures alone, invoking the telecom buildout of the 1990s and the gap between technology investment and measurable productivity. He says the key evidence will be Microsoft’s actual AI consumption and valuable output over the next two quarters: lower spending with output maintained would suggest earlier use was unnecessary, while declining output could mean the tokens were worth their cost.