Katie Stallard

The conflict between the United States and Iran shows no sign of ending, despite Donald Trump’s repeated claims that Iran is close to capitulation. Tehran has resisted the US naval blockade and proposed reopening the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for its removal, while Washington is considering extending the blockade, launching further air strikes, seizing territory or recovering Iran’s enriched uranium. Both sides appear willing to endure substantial economic pain, raising oil prices above $120 a barrel and threatening a broader global crisis. Experts doubt that economic warfare will quickly force Iran to concede, particularly as it explores alternative export routes and receives diplomatic and potentially military support from Russia. China is also seeking de-escalation because of the threat to its energy supplies and export economy, but has limited influence over the negotiations. Trump could declare victory and withdraw or escalate the war, with continuation for several more months presented as the more likely outcome.

Donald Trump has claimed a historic agreement to disarm Hamas, but the deal remains unresolved because Hamas conditions disarmament on an end to Israeli hostilities and troop withdrawal, while Israel insists Hamas disarm first. The Board of Peace has outlined a roadmap and a technocratic Gaza administration, but the key sequencing dispute remains unsettled. Netanyahu faces pressure from far-right coalition figures to reject withdrawal while also seeking Trump's support. Meanwhile, Israeli strikes and deaths in Gaza have continued despite the formal ceasefire, and the wider conflict with Iran remains unstable.

Donald Trump’s announcement of a historic agreement for Hamas to disarm has not resolved the central dispute over sequencing. Hamas conditions weapons handover on an end to Israeli hostilities and troop withdrawal, while Israel insists that disarmament must come first. The Board of Peace has outlined a roadmap but the timetable remains unsettled, and Israeli hard-right opposition is pressuring Benjamin Netanyahu to reject withdrawal. The Gaza ceasefire has also failed to stop near-daily Israeli strikes, with more than 1,000 people reportedly killed since the supposed end of fighting. The agreement may represent progress, but its implementation remains highly uncertain amid continuing tensions in Gaza and the widening conflict with Iran.

Russia’s nuclear threats during the war in Ukraine marked the return of nuclear danger to the centre of international security, while the arms-control system built after the Cuban missile crisis is collapsing. The expiration of the last major US-Russia treaty, Russia’s deployment and expanded nuclear doctrine, Donald Trump’s doubts about alliances, and growing European defence autonomy are increasing uncertainty. Saudi Arabia and South Korea may explore nuclear options, while China is rapidly expanding its arsenal and refusing negotiations until the imbalance with the US and Russia narrows. The emerging three-body nuclear relationship among Washington, Moscow and Beijing, combined with possible proliferation in Europe, East Asia and the Middle East, could produce a more unstable global order in which more states conclude that only their own nuclear deterrent can guarantee security.

Volodymyr Zelensky’s dismissal of Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov after a breakdown in relations with armed-forces chief Oleksandr Syrskyi has triggered protests, a senior resignation and a public political confrontation. Fedorov’s supporters credit him with modernising Ukraine’s war effort through drones and technological innovation, while critics say he lacked military experience and neglected manpower and conventional warfare. The reshuffle, following other controversial decisions and corruption scandals, has left Zelensky without parliamentary votes to confirm a replacement and Ukraine with acting ministers during a critical phase of the war. The resulting divisions have undermined the appearance of wartime unity and handed Vladimir Putin a significant political advantage.

Russia’s war in Ukraine is increasingly imposing visible costs on Russian civilians through fuel shortages, infrastructure disruption, inflation and drone attacks, while its battlefield gains have slowed despite enormous casualties. Putin has failed to secure the diplomatic settlement he expected and faces declining public support, but Russia’s elite remains too depoliticised and dependent to challenge him. The Kremlin continues to frame the war as part of a broader confrontation with the West, supported by China, North Korea and Iran, while investing heavily in drones, artificial intelligence and hybrid warfare. Ukraine’s resilience and technological innovation are constraining Russia, but shortages of air-defence systems leave its cities vulnerable. Rather than seeking an exit, Putin appears likely to intensify the war and potentially expand covert or overt pressure against Europe and NATO.

Ukrainian long- and medium-range drone strikes against Russian energy infrastructure are bringing the consequences of the war into Russia, causing fuel shortages, pressure on air defences and growing public anxiety. Vladimir Putin has been forced to acknowledge the problems while presenting himself as the solution, but he continues to reject a limited ceasefire and maintains expansive territorial aims encompassing the Donbas, Novorossiya and potentially southern Ukraine. Falling approval, internet restrictions and economic disruption are increasing domestic discontent, yet the analysis argues that Putin may respond not by backing down but by escalating the conflict to project strength.

Donald Trump’s attempt to restore Washington’s algae-plagued reflecting pool illustrates his confidence in personal intuition over expert advice. A project initially presented as a quick, inexpensive fix grew to $14.7 million, involved no-bid contracts and briefly produced a blue pool before algae returned and the coating began peeling. Rather than acknowledge the project’s complexity, Trump blamed alleged left-wing vandalism and continued to promise eventual victory, reinforcing the argument that his political style rests on denying limits imposed by nature, economics and institutional reality.

Donald Trump signed the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding with Iran at Versailles after three months of war, abandoning earlier demands for regime change, the elimination of Iran's missile arsenal and the surrender of its nuclear stockpile. The agreement calls for non-interference, reopening the Strait of Hormuz, renewed nuclear negotiations under International Atomic Energy Agency supervision, the release of frozen Iranian funds and a phased lifting of US sanctions. It is only a temporary framework, with a 60-day timetable that can be extended, and leaves major risks unresolved. Iran, Israel—particularly Benjamin Netanyahu—and Trump himself could still derail the détente, while the agreement leaves Trump with a weaker version of the pre-war status quo after substantial casualties and economic disruption.

Kim Jong Un has gained leverage over China by transforming North Korea into a de facto nuclear power and deepening military cooperation with Russia. North Korea’s support for Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine has brought cash, oil, food and sensitive military technology, reducing its dependence on China. Although Xi Jinping remains concerned that North Korea’s nuclear arsenal could destabilise East Asia and encourage proliferation in Japan and South Korea, Beijing prefers tolerating the regime to risking its collapse or a US-aligned unified Korean Peninsula. The US-Israeli strikes on Iran have further reduced Kim’s incentive to surrender his weapons, while his visit to a nuclear fuel facility signalled plans to expand the arsenal. Xi’s visit to Pyongyang therefore reflects both China’s diminished influence over Kim and its broader effort to consolidate an alignment of revisionist autocracies while portraying itself as more globally capable than the United States.

A Russian drone involved in an attack on Ukraine struck an apartment building in Galati, Romania, injuring two people and intensifying concerns about the war spilling into NATO territory. Although the incident was probably accidental, it follows repeated drone incursions and reflects the growing scale and sophistication of long-range attacks. NATO plans to reinforce its eastern defences through measures including Eastern Sentry, but faces major capacity and industrial challenges. The article argues that Russia’s battlefield difficulties are driving more nuclear signalling, threats against European diplomats and hybrid warfare, and warns that a Russian victory in Ukraine could eventually enable an attack on a NATO member.

The Trump administration has intensified pressure on Cuba through an oil blockade, criminal charges against Raúl Castro, direct appeals to Cubans, increased reconnaissance, and a US naval deployment. These measures have deepened Cuba's fuel shortages, blackouts, and food crisis, while Washington portrays the Cuban government as a security threat linked to Russia and China. Although a military operation would be riskier than the raid that captured Nicolás Maduro—especially while US forces remain tied down in the Middle East—the article argues that Trump's failure in Iran and declining approval ratings may make him more determined to seek a quick political victory by claiming to liberate Cuba.

Donald Trump’s return to Beijing is unlikely to produce a breakthrough on the Iran war or other major disputes. Xi Jinping is expected to offer an elaborate welcome, symbolic trade agreements and possibly investment announcements, but no serious concessions on Iran, Taiwan or semiconductor restrictions. Both leaders have incentives to extend their fragile trade truce rather than risk renewed economic conflict. The article argues that China’s relative gains from US strategic failures are tempered by its own slowing economy, demographic crisis, debt and military uncertainties. Rather than attack Taiwan, Xi is more likely to exploit perceptions of declining US reliability through pressure short of war. Trump is therefore likely to return home flattered but without a viable route to victory or an end to the Iran conflict.

The apparent breakthrough over reopening the Strait of Hormuz quickly collapsed after Iran reinstated strict controls, ships reported coming under fire, and a US Navy destroyer seized an Iranian cargo vessel. Donald Trump’s triumphant claims that Iran had conceded on the strait and its enriched uranium were rejected by Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who accused him of making false claims. Both sides remain reluctant to resume full-scale fighting but continue to reject the other’s peace terms, retaining significant leverage through Iran’s control of global energy traffic and the US ability to target Iran’s infrastructure. Indirect negotiations via Pakistan may extend the ceasefire, but failure could lead to renewed war.

Donald Trump’s first 100 days of his second term are portrayed as a deliberate combination of provocation, executive power grabs and disruptive policy reversals, including tariff threats, attacks on institutions and disregard for due process. Democratic scholars Lucan Way and Kim Lane Scheppele argue that the United States has entered a form of competitive authoritarianism, in which elections remain but the administration weakens courts, Congress, media, universities and the civil service through executive action and “autocratic legalism.” Trump’s low overall approval rating could fuel a broad anti-Trump coalition, but his strong Republican base and tolerance for political violence may sustain his power. The article concludes that democratic reversal remains possible, while warning that free elections and a peaceful transfer of power in 2026 and 2028 cannot be taken for granted.