معتز أبو سمرة

Israeli strikes on the Abu al-Duhur military airfield in eastern Idlib are presented as a warning to Turkey against reactivating the base or establishing air and drone facilities in northern Syria. Turkey seeks to consolidate a lasting military foothold and fill security vacuums, while Israel fears that Turkish bases and air defenses would restrict its freedom of action and undermine its air superiority. Ankara is expected to favor diplomatic responses, stronger security coordination, and deployments elsewhere rather than direct confrontation, with Washington pursuing deconfliction mechanisms. The Makkah mutual-defense agreement between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan could give Ankara additional political leverage, although existing economic, aviation, and diplomatic ties between Turkey and Israel remain intact. Direct war is considered unlikely for now, but the absence of effective mechanisms to manage competition could allow the rivalry to escalate, despite the two countries’ shared interest in limiting Iranian influence.

The end of the 60-day Iran–US de-escalation period is unlikely to produce an immediate dramatic shift, but it will deepen an already unstable confrontation. Tehran is using drone and proxy activity in Iraq, Yemen and the Red Sea to demonstrate its reach, deter US military action and improve its negotiating position on security guarantees and sanctions, while avoiding large-scale casualties that could trigger open war. Washington’s options are constrained by the costs and uncertain results of a major attack, leaving expanded economic sanctions as its main tool despite their limited effect on Iran. Gulf states are increasingly frustrated with US policy and the perceived failure of American defenses, prompting interest in alternative security arrangements such as the Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani Mecca defense agreement. The next phase is therefore more likely to focus on managing escalation through indirect pressure and economic coercion than on achieving a decisive military or diplomatic settlement.

The Iran war exposes deep divisions within the Gulf Cooperation Council despite a shared interest in keeping the Strait of Hormuz open. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain face different geographic, economic, and security risks, producing divergent approaches to diplomacy, military action, and alternative energy routes. The UAE is developing a pipeline to Fujairah, while Kuwait is considering routes through Saudi or Emirati infrastructure, although such projects remain vulnerable to Iranian attacks and Houthi operations. Saudi Arabia favors cautious crisis management, the UAE pursues more independent alliances, Qatar acts as a mediator, and Oman seeks accommodation with Tehran. The crisis is likely to reshape Gulf alliances toward pragmatic bilateral and issue-specific partnerships, while raising questions about the future role and viability of the GCC.

Escalation around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait could transform the Iran–United States conflict into a wider struggle over strategic maritime routes. The analysis identifies four scenarios: calculated deterrence involving limited Houthi attacks and targeted responses; a dual-front conflict extending into Somaliland and the Horn of Africa; direct US–Iran naval confrontation if Iran attempts to close Bab el-Mandeb and the Strait of Hormuz; and sharper alignment among global power blocs led by Russia and China. Disruption would raise insurance and shipping costs, strain global supply chains, affect the Suez Canal and energy markets, and encourage a larger international naval presence. Economic red lines and Tehran’s ability to control the scale of Houthi attacks may restrain a full-scale war, but miscalculation could trigger an uncontrollable regional conflict.

The article argues that intelligence agencies exploit extremist and insurgent groups as proxy tools, using ideological rivalries and local vulnerabilities to obtain information or conduct deniable operations. It highlights reports that Mossad recruited ISIS members in Iran and links Israel’s alleged penetration of Iran to attacks on its nuclear program and the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh. The author presents two interpretations of terrorist organizations: products of complex social and political conditions later manipulated by intelligence services, or groups deliberately expanded to produce strategic chaos. Historical examples include CIA-backed support for Afghan militants during the Soviet war, the later emergence of al-Qaeda, and temporary U.S. cooperation with Iraqi Shiite political forces after the 2003 invasion. The article concludes that such groups can function as dormant cells activated or discarded according to state interests, while warning against viewing them simply as defenders of faith or national sovereignty.

Prolonged conflicts in several Arab countries have transformed demographic and territorial realities, creating conditions that normalize de facto political fragmentation. Failures of national governance, weakened social contracts, and the rise of localized armed power structures have pushed states such as Sudan, Libya, Yemen and Iraq toward forms of partition resembling informal federalism or managed cantons. External actors increasingly accept these arrangements as practical solutions, reinforcing divisions rather than reversing them. The shift from temporary displacement to permanent demographic reconfiguration makes coexistence under unified national frameworks more difficult, raising the risk of sustained instability and legitimized fractured entities across the region.

Trump’s cancellation of the framework agreement with Iran shifts regional dynamics by increasing pressure on Europe and NATO to assume greater security and energy‑related responsibilities. The move weakens Iran’s diplomatic faction, strengthens hardline elements, and reshapes the distribution of military and political burdens in the Gulf. Washington positions itself as an external arbiter while pushing allies to absorb the costs of escalation, creating a new geopolitical landscape in which European and regional actors face heightened security challenges as the United States maintains strategic flexibility.

U.S. airstrikes on Iranian targets and President Trump’s declaration that temporary agreements with Tehran have ended signal a shift toward a more aggressive strategy aimed at weakening Iran’s military and political resilience. Iran’s renewed attacks on commercial vessels provided justification for Washington to abandon diplomatic restraint and move toward pressure designed to erode the regime internally through military, intelligence, and psychological means. European governments, though publicly opposed to direct military involvement, are preparing logistical and political support, including new sanctions against the Revolutionary Guard. The internal Iranian landscape is increasingly unstable, with economic hardship, public frustration, and divisions within the ruling elite reducing the regime’s ability to mobilize national unity. Intensified external pressure combined with deep internal discontent creates conditions that could push Iran toward a critical point of internal fracture as new rounds of conflict unfold.

U.S. strikes on more than 80 IRGC targets and the end of the temporary ceasefire have escalated tensions, shifting Washington toward a strategy aimed at weakening Iran’s military, political and internal stability. European states, pressured by rising energy risks, appear prepared to offer logistical and diplomatic support despite refusing use of their bases. Iran’s renewed attacks on commercial shipping provided justification for Washington to abandon previous understandings and adopt measures intended to exploit Iran’s internal vulnerabilities. Mounting domestic economic strain, political division and public frustration create conditions for internal unrest that external pressure may amplify. The convergence of military escalation and internal discontent increases the likelihood of destabilization within Iran in the coming weeks.

Turkish regional expansion is framed as a structured, state‑to‑state strategy aiming to convert military presence into long‑term economic and institutional influence in Somalia, Libya, and northern Syria. Structural weaknesses in these unstable arenas, Turkey’s economic constraints, and competition with major powers limit the sustainability of its investments and risk turning them into costly bargaining chips. The strategy’s long‑term viability is tied to President Erdoğan’s leadership, and a post‑Erdoğan shift toward traditional inward‑focused policy could lead to dismantling much of this external engagement.

U.S. policy shifts toward Iran have undermined Benjamin Netanyahu’s electoral strategy, weakening his claim of exclusive influence over Washington and exposing Israel’s isolation from regional negotiations. Mounting pressure from the Trump administration to reduce military activity in Lebanon, combined with stalled outcomes in Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran, has eroded his political capital. Netanyahu’s proposal to reduce reliance on U.S. military aid has divided Israeli opinion, strengthening far‑right support while alarming security institutions and moderates. Rising opposition figures, including Neftali Bennett and Yair Lapid with their new “Together” party, show growing polling strength. With persistent security crises and no decisive military achievements, Netanyahu faces unprecedented electoral challenges despite attempts to reshape the political narrative and consolidate power.

Netanyahu faces deep electoral challenges as the United States shifts its policy toward Iran and pressures Israel to reduce military operations in Lebanon. His traditional advantage in managing US relations has weakened, while Israeli dissatisfaction grows over the lack of decisive results in Gaza, Lebanon and Iran. Opposition figures Bennett and Lapid gain momentum through their new party, which leads recent polls. Netanyahu attempts to reshape the political narrative through claims of asserting Israeli independence and by considering structural changes within Likud or forming a new party, but internal and external pressures continue to erode his political standing.

Turkey seeks the removal of defense‑industry restrictions and proposes an unconditional security network within NATO, while France resists due to its commitment to European strategic autonomy and longstanding tensions with Ankara. Competing defense interests intensify the divide, with Turkey promoting its KAAN fighter program through Gulf partnerships and France defending its established Rafale market and leadership in European air‑combat projects. Divergent positions on regional crises and defense cooperation sustain mistrust, turning NATO into a stage for a broader struggle over economic, technological and geopolitical influence.

Iraq faces accelerated shifts in the balance between the state and armed factions as the government enforces a September deadline to restrict weapons to official institutions while preparing for the end of the international coalition’s mission. Some groups have complied by placing their forces under state control, while others remain resistant. Muqtada al‑Sadr drives part of the current transformation by separating Saraya al‑Salam from his political movement and urging all factions to surrender their weapons, though loyalty to leaders rather than state institutions undermines genuine disarmament. The article highlights the structural dilemma created by legally integrating the Popular Mobilization Forces as independent brigades within the armed forces, giving them official legitimacy while maintaining autonomous ideological and political loyalties. This duality leaves Iraq with fragmented sovereignty and multiple power centers capable of challenging state authority, weakening the state’s ability to monopolize force and maintain stable governance.

Iraq faces a critical phase as the government sets a firm deadline to disarm armed factions and consolidate weapons under state authority while preparing for the end of the international coalition’s mission. Several major factions have agreed to submit their armed units to state control, while others remain resistant. Muqtada al-Sadr drives a political shift by formally separating Saraya al-Salam from his movement and urging all factions to commit to state authority. Structural challenges persist due to the legally entrenched hybrid nature of the Popular Mobilization Forces, whose units retain political and ideological loyalties despite formal state affiliation. This duality undermines the state’s monopoly on force, enabling factions to preserve mobilization capabilities and exert political pressure, leaving Iraq with fragmented sovereignty and competing military doctrines within its security apparatus.

Framework agreements between the United States and Iran and between Lebanon and Israel are portrayed as tools for postponing complex conflicts rather than resolving them. Digital-era pressures and social media dynamics constrain traditional diplomatic flexibility, while deferring core issues creates structural vulnerabilities that surface during implementation. The Iran file faces technical challenges around enrichment and oversight, and the Lebanese context is complicated by Hezbollah’s rejection of state-led agreements, the fragility of the army’s role, and deep-seated sectarian and security dynamics. Both cases illustrate how incomplete frameworks risk rapid collapse when confronted with real-world tests.

Rubio’s Gulf tour sought to calm concerns over the U.S.–Iran memorandum of understanding, but Gulf states remain unconvinced as the agreement overlooks Iran’s missile and drone programs and leaves its regional proxies untouched. The deal’s financial concessions and Iran’s emerging role in managing the Strait of Hormuz deepen regional anxieties, especially after the recent war exposed vulnerabilities in U.S. defense commitments. Gulf capitals increasingly view American security guarantees as unreliable and are turning toward bilateral defense arrangements and potential partnerships with powers like China and Russia while exploring limited understandings with Iran. Iranian gains from the conflict and U.S. strategic missteps shifted regional power balances, and Rubio’s assurances appear insufficient to restore Gulf confidence in Washington’s security umbrella.

Argues that Netanyahu’s push for U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal removed restrictions on Iran, enabling it to raise enrichment levels and approach nuclear weapons capability. Notes that Iran now views its nuclear program as essential to state survival, resisting inspection of damaged sites while the U.S. seeks stronger oversight in Geneva negotiations. Emphasizes that Iran’s accumulated technical knowledge and security doctrine make dismantling the program unlikely, turning current talks into crisis management rather than a path to a final resolution.

A regional quartet composed of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey and Pakistan seeks to establish a coordinated framework to contain Iran’s influence amid US‑Iran negotiations and emerging regional realignments. The initiative aims to counter Iran’s use of Hezbollah as a bargaining tool by building political and military deterrence and supporting Lebanese state institutions. While the quartet shares significant interests, internal differences and historical challenges within Islamic alliances limit prospects for forming a durable strategic bloc. The decisive test for the group will be its ability to reduce Hezbollah’s regional leverage and influence future security arrangements in the Middle East.

U.S.–Iran negotiations in Geneva place the Lebanon and Hezbollah issue at the forefront, reflecting Donald Trump’s prioritization of reshaping regional dynamics and advancing a broader diplomatic project involving Israel and Saudi Arabia. Washington applies intense pressure on Israel, including threats to limit military aid, pushing Netanyahu toward concessions seen as essential for U.S. regional goals. The resulting friction leaves Netanyahu politically isolated ahead of Israeli elections, while Iran and its allies retain regional influence. The U.S. seeks to impose a Lebanon ceasefire arrangement as a cornerstone of wider agreements, positioning Trump for a major diplomatic victory and forcing Israel into difficult strategic choices.

The memorandum of understanding signed by the United States and Iran grants Tehran major economic and geopolitical benefits in exchange for freezing rather than dismantling its nuclear program, raising concerns among regional allies, especially Israel. Key enforcement mechanisms and monitoring procedures are deferred to future negotiations, weakening U.S. leverage and allowing Iran significant room for delay. The structure of the agreement provides both governments immediate political gains while postponing decisive resolutions, leaving Iran’s nuclear capabilities in a legally ambiguous state and transforming core commitments into negotiable future promises.

The article argues that the United States is entering a period of declining global dominance, comparing its current confrontation with Iran to Britain's loss of imperial status after the 1956 Suez Crisis. It highlights the strain of multiple simultaneous geopolitical challenges on American power, the limits of military coercion, weakening alliances, and the rise of alternative powers such as China and Russia. The author contends that the US can no longer impose unilateral dictates and that the ongoing negotiations with Iran reveal the constraints on American influence, signaling a broader shift toward a multipolar international order.

Tensions between the United States and Israel intensify as Donald Trump pursues a strategic agreement with Iran aimed at stabilizing markets and avoiding further conflict, while Benjamin Netanyahu views the deal as limiting Israel’s military options and undermining his political standing. Israel faces growing constraints in Lebanon under the new framework, and its ability to act independently against Iran is limited by reliance on U.S. military capabilities. Washington sees regional fronts, including Lebanon, as leverage in negotiations with Tehran, while Israel may attempt to counter the agreement by exploiting divisions within the U.S. administration. The evolving situation underscores shifting power dynamics, with Iran regaining leverage, the U.S. prioritizing de-escalation, and Israel left navigating diminished support and rising internal pressures.

The proposed U.S.–Iran memorandum establishes a 60‑day negotiation framework that grants Iran major strategic gains, including economic relief, partial sanctions suspension, access to frozen funds and recognition of its regional role. In exchange, Iran would freeze but not dismantle nuclear activities and accept monitoring mechanisms. Israel strongly opposes the approach, arguing it preserves Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and eases pressure prematurely. Differing expectations between Washington and Tehran, combined with Israeli resistance and potential military escalation, threaten the stability of the negotiation process, making the framework only an initial step toward a fragile and uncertain agreement.

The ongoing war in Sudan has entered its fourth year, driving the country toward fragmentation as armed groups, tribal militias and rival military forces entrench control over regional territories. Darfur faces the highest risk of de facto separation due to ethnic polarization and the expanding influence of the Rapid Support Forces, while eastern Sudan experiences rising tribal tensions driven by geopolitical interests in the Red Sea. Weak state institutions, war economies and foreign interference accelerate the collapse of national cohesion, leaving military dynamics to reshape Sudan’s borders as political actors fail to provide a viable path toward reunification.

Iran’s twelve‑hour exchange of strikes with Israel was used to assert leverage in ongoing negotiations with the United States, signaling that any agreement ignoring its interests would destabilize the region. Actions such as closing the Strait of Hormuz, deploying new ballistic missiles, and coordinating with allied groups highlighted its military capabilities and regional reach. The brief conflict also reinforced Iran’s intent to maintain its influence in Lebanon and Yemen while pressuring Washington by raising the political and economic cost of negotiations. Trump’s desire for a rapid deal and Israel’s actions increased Iran’s bargaining power, enabling it to negotiate as a dominant regional actor rather than a weakened state seeking sanctions relief.

Tensions between the United States and Israel intensified after revelations of Israeli espionage targeting American officials, exposing deeper disputes between Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu over strategy toward Iran and Hezbollah. Historical precedents underscore long-standing Israeli attempts to prioritize its interests even when clashing with Washington’s objectives. The scandal emerged as Congress considers expanding technological defense cooperation with Israel, prompting concerns about partnering with a state deemed a high-risk intelligence threat. Recent resignations and public criticism from U.S. officials reflect widening institutional unease, while global public opinion toward Israel has sharply deteriorated. Despite growing friction, a decisive rupture remains unlikely, though recent events highlight significant shifts within U.S. institutions and in Israel’s international image.

Negotiations between Lebanon and Israel raise hopes for reducing Iranian and Hezbollah influence, yet the proposed security arrangements are unlikely to achieve disarmament or limit Hezbollah’s power. Iran retains leverage by using Hezbollah in broader negotiations with Washington, while any redeployment of the group could deepen its control inside Lebanon. Israel’s internal political pressures and the ongoing strain on regional militaries complicate implementation. The United States faces diminishing time and credibility as Trump seeks a diplomatic win amid strategic miscalculations. Durable agreement remains doubtful without Israeli willingness to separate military goals from electoral considerations and reduce the conflict’s escalation potential.

Geopolitical pressures, internal conflicts, and competing regional and international interests have weakened or dismantled centralized state structures across several Middle Eastern countries. Syria, Libya, Yemen, Sudan, Lebanon, and Somalia face fragmentation driven by militia power, external intervention, and entrenched sectarian or tribal identities. The persistence of parallel economies and warlord influence obstructs state reconstruction. Possible future trajectories include de facto partition, fragile federal arrangements, or full fragmentation into new internationally recognized entities. Concentrated natural resources and lack of institutional safeguards exacerbate disputes, making a return to unified state models increasingly unlikely as new political forms shaped by external power balances emerge.