محمد حسن الساعدي

Ali Al-Zaidi’s government is portrayed as having completed Iraq’s long political effort to secure the withdrawal of U.S. forces. The article argues that Al-Zaidi combined popular and parliamentary legitimacy with diplomatic negotiations, presenting the withdrawal as a national achievement and a step toward full sovereignty. It also highlights the risks of security deterioration and regional pressure, saying the government sought to strengthen Iraqi institutions and the national army to prevent chaos. After the withdrawal, Baghdad aimed to redefine relations with Washington around equal cooperation in economics, education and technology rather than occupation, positioning Iraq as an independent state in the international system.

Economic crises involving inflation, unemployment and debt are presented as a decisive test for democracy across the Middle East and North Africa. Lebanon’s financial collapse and Tunisia’s combination of economic hardship and declining confidence in democratic politics illustrate how deteriorating living standards can erode trust in institutions and increase support for authoritarian alternatives. Social media can amplify popular pressure while also deepening polarization, and international financial assistance or sanctions can significantly alter domestic political outcomes. The region may see successful economic and political reform, democratic backsliding toward stricter rule, or elections continuing while democratic institutions weaken. Sustainable democracy therefore requires economic justice, social welfare and a renewed social contract between citizens and the state.

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zeidi’s anti-corruption campaign has involved arrests of lawmakers, former officials and prominent businessmen, along with asset seizures and travel bans based partly on testimony from senior oil officials. The campaign has attracted popular and political support amid economic hardship, poor services and declining confidence in state institutions. Its success will depend on whether the government can confront powerful party and armed-faction networks, reach senior beneficiaries, recover stolen funds and maintain transparency rather than use the drive for political targeting. The campaign’s timing ahead of al-Zeidi’s expected Washington visit also signals an effort to demonstrate seriousness to international partners. Its outcome could shape Iraq’s political system, institutional reform and public trust.

The Middle East is described as undergoing “controlled turmoil” amid a direct 2026 confrontation between Iran, the United States, and Israel, alongside continuing instability in Syria, Gaza, Sudan, Libya, and Yemen. The conflict has escalated from proxy warfare to open regional confrontation, including Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz, signaling a shift in the regional balance of power. Gulf states are portrayed as pursuing diplomatic and economic efforts to contain tensions, while competing visions center on expanding the Abraham Accords or advancing a two-state solution. With no unified project for regional security and major powers pursuing inconsistent policies, the region remains vulnerable to sudden escalation and possible political or territorial reconfiguration.

Ali Falih Al-Zaidi’s government faces a difficult combination of Iraq’s budget crisis, declining or interrupted oil revenues, delayed payments, unemployment, public protests and entrenched corruption. Its reform agenda prioritizes economic diversification, private-sector development, anti-corruption enforcement, improved public services and job creation for young people, while seeking support from the International Monetary Fund and stronger economic ties with regional and international partners. The government’s central structural challenge is reducing dependence on oil and moving from a rentier-state model toward a developmental state with stronger, more transparent institutions. Its success will depend on quickly approving the national budget, delivering tangible employment and service improvements, and converting reform promises into results; failure could intensify popular and political pressure and threaten its stability.

Iraq has maintained a pattern of peaceful transfers of power since 2003 through periodic elections, elected parliaments and constitutional institutions established in 2005. The political system has survived terrorism, the Islamic State’s territorial expansion, oil-related economic crises and mass protests, while preserving state institutions and rebuilding security forces. Although the sectarian power-sharing system helps include Shiite, Sunni, Kurdish and minority communities, it also fuels criticism over inefficiency, corruption and exclusion. Persistent problems include weak public services, administrative and financial corruption, and regional and international interference, but continued electoral participation and peaceful protest are presented as evidence of popular support for a democratic system capable of adapting to crises.

Ali al-Zaidi’s effort to form an Iraqi government is portrayed as a complex political balancing act rather than a routine constitutional transition. As a compromise candidate after the withdrawal of prominent figures, he must preserve unity within the Shiite Coordination Framework while negotiating with Sunni and Kurdish forces over ministerial posts, the budget and the powers of the Kurdistan Region. Proposals for multiple deputy prime ministers have revived concerns about administrative bloat and political patronage, while al-Zaidi’s attempt to limit senior posts has faced resistance from political blocs. Washington’s support is conditional on excluding armed factions close to Iran, creating an additional domestic and international dilemma. Although his program emphasizes economic development, youth empowerment and institutional reform, entrenched power-sharing, weapons outside state control, electricity shortages, currency pressures and weak border authority may prevent structural change. His success will depend on whether he can reconcile these competing demands and move Iraq toward a functioning state institutions.

The war in the Middle East is presented as a global geopolitical and economic crisis rather than a localized conflict. Disruptions to energy routes and maritime trade could raise oil and gas prices, worsen inflation, obstruct supply chains, and increase import costs for energy-dependent countries. Financial-market uncertainty may drive investors toward gold and the dollar, while affected states face higher military spending, weaker social investment, and greater sovereign-debt risks. Although some energy-exporting countries may benefit from higher revenues, prolonged instability could encourage new alliances, reshape global trade and energy networks, and redistribute economic power. Regional stability is therefore described as essential to sustained global growth and balanced international markets.

A new maritime dispute has emerged between Iraq and Kuwait after Iraq deposited maritime maps and coordinates with the United Nations in early 2026. Kuwait regarded the move as an infringement on its sovereignty, particularly around Fisht al-Qaid and Fisht al-Aij, while Baghdad defended it as an exercise of sovereign rights. The dispute is rooted in longstanding tensions over borders and sovereignty, including the sensitive Khor Abdullah waterway and the legacy of Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Continued escalation could damage diplomatic, economic, security, energy, and maritime-transport cooperation, but direct negotiations or regional mediation could help resolve the issue. The analysis concludes that permanent dialogue and compliance with international law are essential to rebuild trust and prevent renewed regional tensions.

The article portrays the confrontation between Iran and Israel as an increasingly open conflict centered on Iran’s nuclear program, regional influence and missile and drone capabilities. It describes U.S. sanctions, military deployments and support for Israel as Washington’s main tools for containing Tehran, while Iran relies on strategic patience, deterrence and allied forces across Iraq, Syria and Yemen. Israel views Iran’s nuclear ambitions as an existential threat and has intensified attacks on weapons-related facilities. The article warns that escalation in the Gulf, particularly around shipping and the Strait of Hormuz, could disrupt global energy markets and draw in outside powers. It argues that the absence of a political path for renewed nuclear negotiations leaves the region vulnerable to a wider war, while Gulf states and Turkey fear becoming proxy battlefields. The conclusion is overtly ideological, accusing Trump and Netanyahu of pursuing a broader project against the region and presenting continued resistance to them as historically and morally necessary.

The Middle East is undergoing a prolonged restructuring of its security order rather than experiencing a series of isolated crises. Conventional conflicts are increasingly intertwined with proxy warfare, drones, artificial intelligence, economic pressure, and competition among regional and global powers. The Iran–United States confrontation, instability in Gaza and Lebanon, and threats to Red Sea shipping are presented as interconnected factors that place Arab states under significant strategic pressure. Sustainable stability, the article argues, requires addressing the Palestinian issue, strengthening development and national institutions, and building collective regional security instead of relying on temporary security deals, military deterrence, or brinkmanship.

The Middle East is undergoing a major reshaping of its security order as conventional conflicts combine with proxy warfare, drone operations, artificial intelligence, and advanced military technologies. The rivalry between Iran and the United States is identified as a decisive factor, while Arab states face pressure to protect their security without being drawn into broader power blocs or confrontation. Instability in the Red Sea is linked to stalled diplomatic efforts in Gaza and Lebanon, and fragile states and non-state actors continue to obstruct the creation of a collective regional security framework. Lasting stability, the analysis argues, requires economic development, resolution of the Palestinian issue, serious dialogue, and cooperation that addresses the roots of conflicts rather than merely managing recurring crises.

Iraq is attempting to manage a difficult relationship with the United States after more than two decades of American military involvement. Baghdad seeks a gradual end to the U.S. military presence while preserving cooperation in security, intelligence, logistics, and economic affairs. The country must also balance Washington's efforts to limit Iranian influence with Iran's growing regional role, while remaining exposed to U.S. leverage over its financial system. The repeal of the U.S. congressional war authorizations from 1991 and 2002 is presented as a possible acknowledgment of Iraqi sovereignty, although doubts remain about whether Washington has abandoned its interventionist approach. New investments by Chevron and other U.S. oil companies could support Iraq's economy but may also create new forms of dependence. The central challenge is whether Iraq can establish a relationship with Washington based on partnership and mutual respect rather than renewed subordination.

Iraq’s political system since 2003 is portrayed as dominated by sectarian and ethnic power-sharing, patronage and factional interests rather than state institutions and citizenship. These patterns have produced weak governance, corruption, public distrust, reactive policymaking and an uncertain foreign policy shaped by competing ties with Iran, the Gulf and Turkey. The country is described as unable to exercise an independent regional role, often becoming a venue for other actors’ conflicts instead of a mediator. The proposed solution is a transformation in political thinking: leaders should prioritize the national interest, unify decision-making, pursue effective regional balancing rather than passive neutrality, and treat citizens as rights-holders. Such reforms could enable Iraq to move from a conflict arena to a regional balancing center, but entrenched interests continue to resist meaningful change.

Iraq’s Coordination Framework repeatedly turns to consensus candidates for prime minister when its factions cannot agree on a dominant partisan figure. The article argues that this approach can prevent political division and limit public backlash, but also exposes the coalition’s internal fragility, susceptibility to popular and external pressure, and inability to make bold decisions. Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s selection after the 2021 elections is presented as a prominent example. The author questions whether the Coordination Framework can move beyond recurring compromise arrangements toward decisive political action, warning that governments built on fragile consensus may lack performance and a clear reform agenda.

Following Iraq’s parliamentary elections, the country is entering a new phase of government formation and state-building. The next government’s success should be judged by its ability to deliver services, create jobs, reduce regional disparities, fight corruption, and implement the programs promised to voters rather than by its parliamentary seat count. Key requirements include choosing ministers on the basis of competence and integrity rather than sectarian or partisan quotas, building durable political alliances while accommodating opposition voices, launching a first-100-days program, expanding digital government, involving domestic civil society, considering constitutional amendments, and pursuing balanced foreign relations that protect Iraq’s sovereignty. Failure to deliver would further erode public trust, while effective governance could restore confidence in the state and strengthen political and social stability.

Iraq and Turkey’s water dispute is presented as a central test of their ability to turn a source of geopolitical tension into cooperation. Turkey’s control over the headwaters of the Tigris and Euphrates and its dam-building under the Southeastern Anatolia Project have contributed to declining flows into Iraq, harming agriculture, food security and public health. A November 2025 agreement, attended by Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, converts 26 previous memoranda into implementable projects, establishes a joint water-management mechanism and provides Turkish support for Iraqi water infrastructure. The agreement could strengthen bilateral ties and expand cooperation in energy, transport and other sectors, but its success depends on political will, transparent oversight, binding commitments and international support amid climate change and domestic pressures.

Israel’s strike on Doha targeting Hamas leaders is portrayed as a dangerous breach of diplomatic and political red lines, particularly because Qatar was mediating Gaza ceasefire talks. The attack prompted broad Arab and Muslim condemnation and an emergency summit, while raising fears of wider regional escalation and diminishing prospects for peaceful mediation. For Iraq, the incident underscores the need to defend national sovereignty more firmly, reflect public support for Palestine in official policy, preserve a balanced foreign-policy stance and potentially support Qatar’s mediation efforts.

Iraq has experienced substantial demographic, infrastructural, economic and democratic development since 2003, with elections becoming the principal mechanism for political change. However, citizens remain distrustful of political forces, while sectarian, nationalist and ethnic blocs continue to compete with broader national interests. Although electoral victories do not guarantee good governance, elections generally produce consensus governments in which major factions share power. The article argues that threats issued by political actors are largely media-driven tactics and that Iraq’s new generation of politicians must decide whether to place the state above their immediate ambitions.

Iraq has largely refrained from actively using its air defenses during the Iran-Israel conflict, apparently seeking to avoid confrontation with the United States and accusations of siding with either party. Israeli violations of Iraqi airspace have exposed major weaknesses in Iraq’s defense infrastructure, which was dismantled after the 2003 U.S. invasion and only partially rebuilt. Baghdad relies mainly on short-range American and Russian systems and has sought strategic air-defense capabilities from South Korea, but its internal divisions and delicate balance between Washington and Tehran limit its freedom of action. The analysis concludes that Iraq is likely to favor non-provocative deterrence over direct intervention, leaving its airspace vulnerable and underscoring the need for political forces to reduce U.S. influence and build more balanced external relations.

The Khor Abdullah dispute has renewed tensions between Iraq and Kuwait after Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court annulled the law ratifying their 2012 maritime-navigation agreement, citing failure to meet the constitutional two-thirds majority required for international treaties. The ruling has raised questions about Iraq’s international commitments, maritime rights, access to the Gulf, and projects such as the Grand Faw Port, while Kuwait views the decision as a breach of a binding international agreement. Iraq is urged to combine legal action, negotiations, and international engagement, including renewed work through joint technical committees and possible regional or UN mediation, to clarify navigation arrangements and maritime boundaries and prevent further political and diplomatic escalation.