Michael Jacobs

The UK government should distinguish between the Jackdaw gasfield and the much larger Rosebank oilfield when deciding whether to grant renewed consent. Jackdaw could be justified narrowly on energy-security grounds because its domestic gas may displace more carbon-intensive LNG imports, whereas Rosebank would produce substantial emissions through 2050, provide little UK energy security and add supply to a global oil market that should be declining. Rosebank should therefore be approved only if its owners pay for carbon capture and storage equivalent to its emissions, alongside strict methane limits; if those conditions make the project uneconomic, that would show it cannot comply with the UK’s net-zero commitments. The government should also support North Sea workers by accelerating decommissioning, which could create more jobs than new drilling, and publish a long-term net-zero transition roadmap for businesses, households and investors.

Keir Starmer should attend the COP30 leaders’ summit in Belém, Brazil, rather than allow concerns about Reform UK voters or time spent abroad to deter him. The summit is a critical opportunity for leaders to address the gap between current national emissions targets and the Paris Agreement’s temperature goals. China’s new targets and the EU’s unresolved ambition leave the world on course for roughly 2.5C of warming, while Brazil’s President Lula and UN Secretary-General António Guterres are proposing stronger climate coordination, deforestation finance and a roadmap for $1.3tn in annual climate finance for developing countries. The summit’s success depends on visible political leadership, and Starmer’s absence could weaken confidence among businesses and financial institutions while allowing Donald Trump to claim that the Paris system has failed.

Labour is pursuing an ambitious structural economic programme aimed at reversing decades of weak UK investment, productivity, trade performance and regional inequality. Its main pillars are faster infrastructure investment, greater state involvement through public ownership and a national wealth fund, stronger labour protections and higher wages to encourage productivity, and measures to improve health, skills and workforce participation. The strategy differs sharply from New Labour’s more market-oriented approach, but its success remains uncertain. With near-term growth weak, borrowing and business conditions difficult, and the threat of renewed US trade conflict, Starmer and Reeves have limited time to demonstrate tangible economic gains before the next election.

The postwar Bretton Woods institutions helped create decades of global growth but later adopted market-oriented policies that imposed spending cuts, deregulation and privatization on developing countries. A new global economic settlement is needed to address climate change, unequal access to finance, mounting sovereign debt, fragile supply chains and multinational tax avoidance. The article argues for expanded development-bank lending, cheaper private finance, debt restructuring, stronger trade partnerships with the Global South and new international taxes. Brazil’s G20 presidency and President Lula’s call to reform institutions dominated by the powers of 1944 are presented as an opportunity to begin that process.

Labour's cautious fiscal presentation under Keir Starmer and Rachel Reeves masks a programme that could be considerably more radical than expected. The party proposes major climate and energy investment, a stronger industrial strategy, public procurement reforms, a national wealth fund, substantial economic devolution, wealth-tax changes, expanded public services, higher minimum wages and stronger workers' rights. Although it has moved away from much of Corbyn's nationalisation agenda, its plans are portrayed as well to the left of New Labour and as a serious response to the UK's weak productivity, trade deficit and regional inequalities. The central challenge is whether Starmer can communicate this progressive programme convincingly enough to turn Labour's electoral advantage into a governing mandate.

Michael Jacobs argues that Liz Truss’s focus on “growth, growth and growth” is too narrow because GDP growth no longer reliably produces rising disposable incomes, greater equality or improved wellbeing. In the UK, recent growth has been driven largely by consumption, stagnant productivity and rising asset values, directing disproportionate gains to wealthy capital owners. Growth also continues to impose severe environmental costs despite some reductions in greenhouse-gas emissions. Jacobs advocates a post-growth approach in which governments prioritize environmental sustainability, reduced inequality, wellbeing and resilience, while allowing fossil-fuel-intensive sectors to shrink and investing in renewable energy and care services.

The UK government’s mini-budget is presented as an inefficient redistribution of wealth toward higher earners rather than a credible growth strategy. Michael Jacobs argues that income-tax cuts will generate limited demand because richer households are more likely to save, while corporation-tax and stamp-duty cuts are unlikely to raise investment and may inflate house prices. Borrowing to fund the measures, alongside energy subsidies and possible spending increases, could add up to £130bn in 2023–24, driving up gilt yields, weakening sterling, increasing import and energy costs, and worsening inflation. The article argues that investment in infrastructure, home insulation and renewable energy would provide a stronger and more sustainable stimulus.

Michael Jacobs argues that the UK should impose a modest windfall tax on oil and gas companies whose profits have surged as energy prices rise. He contends that BP and Shell already benefit from extensive tax reliefs, that a limited tax increase would not prevent investment, and that North Sea production offers little energy-security benefit because most output is exported and priced globally. He also challenges the companies’ claims about supporting the low-carbon transition and dismisses concerns about pensioners, noting that most shareholder profits flow overseas. Revenue from the tax, he argues, should help shield low-income households from soaring energy bills.

Michael Jacobs argues that Chancellor Rishi Sunak is deliberately restricting spending in order to position himself as a tax-cutting successor to Boris Johnson. He links Sunak’s fiscal rules and public-investment cap to problems with pandemic support, northern rail infrastructure, the net-zero strategy and social care reform. Jacobs contends that the rules are self-imposed, economically unjustified and especially damaging when borrowing costs are low and the UK needs investment in housing, energy, transport, public services and productivity.

Michael Jacobs argues that Rishi Sunak’s claim that the UK must cut spending to reduce public debt is economically misleading and politically motivated. Although debt is high, low borrowing costs and strong demand for UK government bonds leave room for sustainable borrowing. Jacobs contends that investment in green infrastructure, transport, health, education, childcare and social care would raise productivity, support employment, reduce inequality and ultimately improve the debt position. He argues that austerity is self-defeating because spending cuts weaken growth and tax receipts, while current inflation is mainly driven by global energy and supply-chain shocks rather than excessive public spending. Sunak’s fiscal rules, Jacobs concludes, are political choices rather than economic necessities, serving Conservative concerns about taxation and his leadership ambitions.

Western governments should not try to restore pre-pandemic economic policies because wage stagnation, insecure work and inequality reflect structural flaws in the prevailing system. Joe Biden’s agenda—public investment, higher taxes, green jobs, expanded social infrastructure and action against monopolies—is presented as an emerging alternative informed by post-financial-crisis economic thinking. The article argues for fiscal expansion, industrial strategy, financial regulation, wealth redistribution, guaranteed incomes, action on racial and gender inequality, and a post-growth focus on sustainability and wellbeing. It concludes that political leaders in the US and UK must move beyond austerity and free-market orthodoxy to address climate and economic crises.

Labour’s historical shifts to the right or left have reflected economic conditions more than a simple conflict between electability and ideology, the authors argue. Centrist, redistributive policies succeeded during periods of strong growth, while leaders such as Clement Attlee and Harold Wilson won with more interventionist platforms during economic crises. Because the financial crash, stagnant wages, weak productivity, regional inequality, precarious work and the climate emergency remain unresolved—and have been worsened by Covid-19—Keir Starmer should pursue a credible programme of structural economic reform rather than move Labour cautiously toward the centre.