انس محمود الشيخ مظهر

Baghdad is accused of changing its rhetoric according to the pressures of Washington, Tehran and domestic armed factions. The article argues that calls to place weapons under state control intensify when U.S. pressure rises but soften after Iranian interventions, allowing external influence to become a justification for domestic inaction. It criticizes the use of political threats and internal power balances as substitutes for accountability, and argues that genuine sovereignty requires measurable steps, clear timelines and institutions capable of enforcing the law.

Recovered money stolen from Iraq’s public treasury should retain its character as public revenue and be included in the financial calculations used to determine the Kurdistan Region’s constitutional share, the article argues. It cites Articles 105 and 121(3) of the Iraqi Constitution, contending that funds do not become exclusively federal merely because they were originally allocated to a federal contract or ministry. Excluding recovered assets could unfairly make the region bear the consequences of corruption while denying it a share of restored national resources. The article calls for transparent disclosure of the amount, source, recovery date, deposit account and accounting treatment of such funds, with explicit rules in the budget and final accounts subject to legislative, judicial and financial oversight.

The commentary argues that Kataib Hezbollah and other Iraqi militias are hypocritically demanding the disarmament of the Peshmerga while refusing to surrender their own weapons. It portrays the Peshmerga as a publicly structured, constitutionally recognized and locally defensive force responsible for protecting Kurdistan’s difficult borders, in contrast to opaque militias with unclear command structures, external ties and cross-border agendas. Any legal dispute over the Peshmerga, the piece argues, should be handled by the Iraqi government, parliament or Federal Supreme Court rather than by another armed faction. It concludes that militia preconditions amount to bargaining with the state from a position of strength, and that dismantling Iran-aligned armed groups is a national necessity because their continued existence serves external interests rather than Iraq’s domestic priorities.

The commentary condemns Lebanese cleric Subhi al-Tufayli for calling the Kurdish component in Syria the “head of the snake” and associating Druze dissent in Suwayda with unacceptable voices. It reviews his history as Hezbollah’s first secretary-general, his conflict with Hezbollah and Amal, his 1998 armed confrontation with Hezbollah and the Lebanese Army, and his subsequent flight from Lebanese justice. The author argues that al-Tufayli has repeatedly shifted ideological positions to serve personal and political interests, and now presents himself as a supporter of the Syrian revolution while attacking Kurdish aspirations. The article defends the Kurdish demand for a federal Syria, argues that such a model is compatible with historical Islamic governance, and condemns calls for bloodshed against an entire community. It concludes by urging religious figures to promote wisdom, peace, dialogue and mutual understanding.

The Kurdistan Region’s parliamentary election results are presented as evidence that voters remain committed to a political formula combining a resilient Kurdish public with cautious, effective leadership. The Kurdistan Democratic Party is credited with winning a comfortable majority and protecting the region from being drawn into wider regional conflicts or aligned with a failing regional camp. The article also highlights declining support for Islamist parties, arguing that Kurdish voters have been influenced by the poor record of Islamists governing elsewhere. It concludes that the political map has changed, but the Kurdistan Democratic Party remains the region’s central and enduring force.

The article argues that Iraq's Federal Supreme Court lacks a fully constitutional legal foundation because its current structure still rests on a 2005 occupation-era order, while the constitutionally required law regulating its composition and selection has never been enacted. It catalogs what the author describes as contradictory rulings on independent bodies, elections, parliamentary majorities, legislative powers, constitutional interpretation, disputed territories, Kurdistan's oil law and the dissolution of Parliament. The court is accused of favoring particular political factions and of being vulnerable to political pressure. The article also raises allegations involving its president's conduct and a disputed appointment linked to his son, concluding that failure to reform the court undermines its remaining legitimacy and independence.

The article argues that Iran has successfully exploited divisions among the United States, Europe and Israel to build regional influence through Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis and Iraqi militias. It contends that a Gaza outcome allowing Iran’s proxies to emerge without major losses would transform Iran from an aspiring regional power into a dominant one, threatening U.S. allies, maritime routes and regional political arrangements. The author says Iran has crossed Washington’s red lines by threatening U.S. bases and allies, but argues that American institutions—not necessarily the Biden administration—are preparing to confront its proxies individually. The projected scenario involves a Gaza truce, intensified U.S. and Yemeni pressure on the Houthis, and a possible Israel-Hezbollah war, which the author believes could leave Iran isolated and reluctant to intervene directly.

The analysis argues that the Gaza war is a complex regional confrontation involving Iran-aligned Shiite militias, Hamas and Israel rather than a simple Arab-Israeli or religious conflict. It contends that Iran uses the Palestinian cause and sectarian identity to build influence, seeks to weaken Israel without eliminating it, and employs regional proxies to pressure Israel and drive U.S. forces from the Middle East. Iran is portrayed as publicly denying responsibility for attacks while allowing its proxies to escalate pressure, whereas Washington is said to be avoiding direct confrontation and increasingly urging Israel to end the Gaza war. The author concludes that the conflict could produce a new regional order divided between an Iranian-aligned bloc and an Arab-Israeli bloc, with the United States attempting to manage the balance between them.

The article argues that Iran has effectively prevailed in Iraq by turning militias created to fight ISIS into politicized armed groups aligned with Tehran. It claims these factions suppress Iraqi protests, participate in regional conflicts, attack diplomatic missions and international coalition bases, and exercise influence over the government and parliament. The author portrays Iraq’s Shiite Islamist parties as failures in governance, citing corruption, insecurity, weak public services, and continuing sectarian and ethnic divisions. The Iraqi government is criticized for lacking the authority to control the militias and for condemning U.S. strikes while failing to protect American forces stationed under bilateral agreements. The article urges Baghdad to prioritize Iraqi national interests, maintain a neutral position in the U.S.-Iran confrontation, and prevent Iraq from being drawn into a wider regional conflict.

The author argues that Baghdad is deliberately using the salaries of Kurdistan Region employees and control over the region’s oil revenues as political weapons. He portrays the policy as collective punishment of Kurdish civilians, compares it with Saddam Hussein’s repression, and accuses Iraq’s Shiite-led political establishment of pursuing sectarian, authoritarian centralization despite Iraq’s federal constitution. The article rejects the prospects of Kurdish delegations resolving the dispute through negotiations and proposes that the United Nations and international community oversee Iraqi oil revenues and guarantee salary payments to Kurdistan employees.

Baghdad is portrayed as applying soft power rather than overt threats to pressure the Kurdistan Region. Although the Iraqi government repeatedly affirms its commitments to agreements on disputed territories, Article 140, oil and gas legislation, population censuses, and the Sinjar agreement, implementation has been repeatedly delayed. Kurdistan’s leverage has weakened after an international ruling halted its independent oil exports through Turkey and Baghdad assumed control of the oil file. The article argues that delayed transfers from the federal budget, including public-sector salaries, could function as a prolonged economic blockade over the next three years, weakening investment, market confidence, and economic activity. It urges Erbil to make the urgent resolution of budget payments the central focus of its negotiations with Baghdad, while noting that regional and international power balances make withdrawal from the Iraqi government difficult for its political participants.

Iraq's recent governments, particularly Mohammed Shia' Al-Sudani's administration, have successfully used the country's strategic position to mediate among regional and international rivals, including Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United States, Syria and Turkey. However, this diplomatic role may reflect external influence and offers only temporary political leverage. The article argues that unresolved domestic disputes—such as the application of Article 140, oil relations with the Kurdistan Region, displaced Sunnis and Sunni representation—matter more to Iraqis than regional files. Addressing these issues, improving public services and reaching durable internal compromises would provide a stronger basis for political legitimacy and stability than seeking approval from foreign powers.