Osman Mirghani

The destruction of hospitals, schools, markets, homes, and essential infrastructure in areas affected by Sudan’s war is presented as a deliberate scorched-earth strategy rather than incidental battlefield damage. The policy is argued to function as collective punishment, psychological warfare, and a means of forcing displacement and demographic change, particularly in Darfur and Kordofan. Citing international humanitarian law, United Nations reporting, and the U.S. genocide determination regarding attacks on the Masalit, the column links these acts to possible war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Beyond immediate suffering, the destruction deepens social divisions, delays civilian return, raises reconstruction costs, and undermines the legitimacy of those seeking territorial control, making future peace and national recovery more difficult.

Debate over leaked details of a US proposal to end Sudan’s war reflects public distrust and limited government transparency. The plan’s central feature, a 90‑day humanitarian ceasefire followed by negotiations on withdrawals and political transition, faces major obstacles due to opposing positions between the Sudanese government and the Rapid Support Forces. Differences focus on withdrawals and control of territory rather than ceasefire duration. The proposal largely extends earlier Quad efforts. Four possible outcomes range from unlikely full acceptance to partial, localized ceasefires, to potential failure should political or military dynamics shift or US attention wane. Battlefield developments will shape whether the initiative advances or collapses.