Paul Taylor

The mass arrival of migrants from Morocco at Spain’s Ceuta enclave triggered rapid criticism of Madrid, particularly from Italy, other European governments and the Trump administration. The episode exposed EU hypocrisy over migration, as leaders condemned Spain’s regularization of undocumented workers while overlooking similar policies elsewhere and failing to examine Morocco’s possible role. Although most migrants soon returned to Morocco and arrivals are below the 2015 peak, the crisis damaged trust, prompted retaliatory controls between Italy and Spain, and showed adversaries how readily European governments can be divided by migration-related fear and misinformation.

Andy Burnham’s domestic priorities could nonetheless lead the UK toward closer cooperation with the European Union. The article argues that Brexit has contributed to weak trade, investment and living standards, making renewed economic engagement a practical necessity alongside compelling security reasons. Burnham could use his charisma to revisit Labour’s limits on the single market, customs union and free movement, while cooperating with Europe on defence industries, strategic technologies and youth mobility. Such a shift could help Labour recover pro-European voters from the Liberal Democrats and Greens while presenting an alternative to Reform’s nationalism, although European governments would resist any attempt by Britain to gain market benefits without accepting corresponding obligations.

NATO survived another turbulent summit dominated by Donald Trump’s threats, criticism of allies and unpredictable positions on Iran, Greenland and European security. Although allies endorsed higher defence spending, expanded military procurement and a stronger European role within NATO, uncertainty remains over the reliability of US support. The summit also produced a significant declaration backing Ukraine, helped by Mark Rutte and European leaders, and secured Trump’s promise to allow Ukraine to produce Patriot interceptors under licence. The alliance remains operational, but its future cohesion is threatened by Washington’s transactional diplomacy and possible US force reductions in Europe.

Paul Taylor argues that John Healey’s resignation over the UK government’s inadequate defence funding exposes a wider European dilemma: governments recognize the growing threat from Russia but fear higher borrowing costs and bond-market reactions. The UK, France and Italy are falling short of NATO’s planned spending trajectory, while the US under Donald Trump is portrayed as becoming less dependable for European security. Taylor proposes jointly issued euro-denominated defence bonds among willing NATO allies, alongside greater use of the EU’s borrowing flexibility, to finance urgent military and infrastructure needs without forcing individual governments into politically destabilizing debt increases. Failing that, Europe may have to accept cuts to welfare and infrastructure, or weaker security and missed NATO targets.

Cuba is facing severe poverty, power shortages, disrupted transport and struggling hospitals as US pressure cuts off fuel supplies and seeks to force political change. The column argues that Europe and Cuba’s traditional allies have largely abandoned the island: Russia is weakened by the war in Ukraine, Venezuela can no longer provide subsidized oil, and Mexico, Brazil and China have avoided challenging Washington. While the author condemns the US blockade and Europe’s muted response, he attributes much of Cuba’s long-term economic and social crisis to communist mismanagement, ideological rigidity and restrictions on freedom. With the EU increasingly divided and preoccupied by other geopolitical conflicts, the article concludes that Europe is unlikely to resist further US pressure on Havana.

Donald Trump’s attacks on NATO, threats to withdraw US military support and alignment with Moscow are prompting European governments to plan for a potentially post-American security order. Germany is expanding its military ambitions, France is discussing extending its nuclear deterrent to European partners, and EU governments have begun testing their mutual-assistance arrangements. Europe still lacks critical US capabilities, including intelligence, missile defence, logistics and command systems, while the Iran war has further depleted weapons supplies. The strongest proposed alternative is a European defence union led by France, Germany and the UK, with support from Poland, Ukraine, NATO and EU resources.

Jordan Bardella and Marine Le Pen’s National Rally have a substantial lead ahead of France’s 2027 presidential election, with Bardella polling as high as 38% and likely to reach the run-off. The fragmented left is unlikely to unite, while the centre-left lacks a broadly appealing candidate. Former prime minister Édouard Philippe currently appears to be the strongest mainstream challenger, but other centrists and conservatives could divide the vote. Potential candidates including Gabriel Attal, Bruno Retailleau, Laurent Wauquiez, Dominique de Villepin and Thierry Breton further complicate efforts to identify a single contender capable of defeating the RN. Unless moderate forces unite behind a credible candidate, a crowded first round could hand the presidency to Bardella.

Paul Taylor reflects on his reporting during the 1979 Iranian Revolution, including his first interview with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and his observations of the early struggle between liberal institutions and clerical power. He argues that the Revolutionary Guards, Basij, clerical courts and Guardian Council enabled Khomeini’s movement to consolidate an authoritarian Islamic state, while the Iran-Iraq war intensified repression. Drawing parallels with the French and Russian revolutions, Taylor contends that foreign aggression often strengthens revolutionary regimes rather than liberating populations. He sees the US-Israeli campaign against Iran as repeating the pattern of external interference established by the 1953 coup, warning that it may preserve hardline rule and worsen Iran’s prospects rather than produce freedom or prosperity.

European governments are preparing for the possibility that Marine Le Pen or Jordan Bardella could lead France after the 2027 presidential election. Partners are accelerating agreements with Paris on nuclear deterrence and the EU’s next long-term budget, while Ukraine’s supporters are pushing for Kyiv to join the EU before a potential French blockade. Emmanuel Macron, politically weakened and barred from seeking another term, is also placing allies in influential, long-term institutional posts to preserve a pro-European orientation. The prospect of a National Rally government is prompting Germany and other European states to seek alternative security partnerships and greater strategic autonomy.

US-mediated Russia-Ukraine peace talks in Geneva ended without agreement on the status of Russian-occupied territories in eastern Ukraine or the future of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Russia was dragging out negotiations, while Ukrainian negotiator Rustem Umerov reported limited progress and Russia said discussions would continue. The live coverage also reported Ukraine’s sanctions against Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko, a dispute between Slovakia and Ukraine over the Druzhba oil pipeline and electricity supplies, investigations in France linked to Jeffrey Epstein, renewed Russian demands for evidence in the Alexei Navalny poisoning case, Germany’s possible restrictions on children’s social-media use, and Ukraine’s boycott of Winter Paralympic events over Russian and Belarusian participation.

Europe must prepare to defend itself with substantially less, or possibly no, US military support. The article argues that increased spending alone will not suffice: European states also need ammunition, logistics, training, larger armed forces and a faster decision-making structure. NATO is constrained by US dominance and unanimity, while the EU lacks military expertise and includes obstructive or non-aligned members. The France- and UK-led Coalition of the Willing, formed in the context of possible security guarantees for Ukraine, could provide the nucleus of a future European defence union. Its core could expand from the E3 to the E6 and include willing EU states, the UK and Norway, potentially gaining a legal foundation through a revived Western European Union treaty.

Paul Taylor argues that Europe should follow Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s strategy of forming coalitions among middle powers rather than relying on accommodation of Donald Trump. Trump’s threats over Greenland, tariffs and NATO demonstrate that the United States can no longer be treated as a dependable guardian of the rules-based order. The EU should support Denmark with credible retaliatory measures, activate its anti-coercion instrument and deepen trade ties with Canada, Japan, Australia, Brazil, India and other partners. Taylor also criticizes the European Parliament for delaying the Mercosur agreement, warning that internal political resistance is undermining Europe’s effort to diversify its trade and achieve a painful but necessary emancipation from US dominance.

French farmers are protesting the EU-Mercosur trade agreement over fears that cheaper, lower-standard South American beef will damage their livelihoods. The commentary argues that EU safeguards are substantial and that French cattle farmers’ deeper problems stem from rising costs, supermarket pricing power and bureaucracy rather than Mercosur. Emmanuel Macron and other French politicians are accused of appeasing the farm lobby instead of defending the deal’s wider economic benefits, thereby reinforcing anti-EU narratives and helping Marine Le Pen’s National Rally gain support among rural voters. This could boost Jordan Bardella’s prospects in the next presidential election and create a serious confrontation between France and the EU.

France’s traditional restaurant sector is shrinking as rising food costs, weaker household finances, remote work, changing dietary habits, labor shortages and delivery services reduce demand for long lunches and freshly cooked meals. Traditional eateries are squeezed between fast-food chains, which benefit from lower prices and convenience, and expensive haute cuisine aimed at wealthy customers. Covid-era changes, including supermarket use of luncheon vouchers and reduced office attendance, accelerated the decline, while tax rules favor takeaway food over dining in. Restaurateurs are increasingly choosing between costly locally sourced cooking and cheaper pre-prepared meals, with the latter generally proving more viable.

The column argues that the Trump administration’s hostility toward the European Union, combined with the rise of domestic populism, economic inequality and unregulated social-media influence, poses a serious threat to Europe’s liberal democracies. It examines possible responses, including faster enforcement of EU digital laws, addressing housing and public-service failures, confronting populists more aggressively and adopting their grassroots and online campaigning techniques. Each approach faces serious limitations: legal enforcement is slow by design, social reforms are difficult to deliver, fear-based messaging often fails, and copying extremist tactics may not work. The author concludes that Europe may need a combination of these strategies, but that the political tide remains against liberal democracy.

Les Républicains are increasingly abandoning France’s traditional republican firewall against Marine Le Pen’s National Rally as they try to retain hard-right voters and electoral relevance. Cooperation is being encouraged by party figures, local electoral pressures and right-wing media, while LR politicians adopt tougher positions on immigration and align with the far right in the European Parliament. The article argues that an alliance would likely make the RN the dominant force in government, undermine citizenship and welfare rights, strain relations with the EU and ultimately destroy LR and the Gaullist legacy.

European leaders should abandon diplomatic restraint and publicly condemn Donald Trump’s assault on US democracy, argues Paul Taylor. The article criticizes Europe’s appeasement of Trump in pursuit of US support against Russia and says his administration has weakened checks and balances, attacked the civil service, judiciary, universities and media, and used military force against domestic protesters. European governments cannot restore US democracy, but they can defend liberal democratic values at home, support American institutions and campaigners, and build practical partnerships with sympathetic US states and local authorities.

An EU summit in Copenhagen exposed deep divisions over European rearmament, support for Ukraine and responses to Russian airspace violations and hybrid attacks. National leaders resisted Ursula von der Leyen’s proposed EU-led defence initiatives, preferring to retain control through national or smaller multinational projects. Industrial disputes between France and Germany are threatening the Future Combat Air System, while a rival UK-Italy-Japan programme advances. The lack of trust and coordination risks weakening Europe and emboldening Vladimir Putin, making urgent cooperation under European and Franco-British leadership essential.

Russia’s incursion into Polish airspace by 19 drones is presented as a deliberate test of NATO’s military response and Europe’s political resolve to support Ukraine. Poland invoked NATO Article 4 after allied forces helped intercept the drones, prompting condemnation from NATO and European leaders. Although Germany, Italy and the US fear escalation, the article argues that Russia’s increasingly aggressive actions require stronger air defences, continued arms deliveries and a clear warning that further violations will bring more severe consequences.

France faces an escalating political and fiscal crisis as Prime Minister François Bayrou’s minority government appears likely to lose a confidence vote over unpopular spending cuts and tax-related reforms. President Emmanuel Macron has few viable options: appointing another prime minister may not produce a workable budget, while a new election could further strengthen Marine Le Pen’s National Rally. Protest calls backed by parts of the left are adding to the instability, although widespread sustained unrest remains uncertain. The fragmented parliament and France’s weak culture of coalition-building risk prolonged paralysis, which could further undermine mainstream parties and increase support for Le Pen and Jordan Bardella.