British teenager Oliver Bearman made a remarkable debut for Ferrari at the Saudi Arabian Grand Prix, finishing seventh and earning widespread praise. As the youngest rookie for the Italian team, Bearman replaced Carlos Sainz and impressed by outperforming seasoned drivers like Lando Norris and Lewis Hamilton. Ferrari teammate Charles Leclerc and team boss Fred Vasseur commended Bearman's talent and composure, while Bearman expressed satisfaction with his performance, acknowledging the advantage of a fast car. Despite his success, Bearman remains uncertain about future F1 opportunities this year.

British teenager Oliver Bearman made a historic debut for Ferrari at the Saudi Arabian Grand Prix, finishing seventh and being named Driver of the Day. At 18 years and 305 days, he became Ferrari's youngest-ever rookie, standing in for Carlos Sainz. Bearman finished ahead of notable drivers Lando Norris and Lewis Hamilton, marking a promising start to his Formula One career.

British teenager Oliver Bearman made a historic debut for Ferrari at the Saudi Arabian Grand Prix, finishing seventh and earning widespread praise. Bearman, the youngest rookie for Ferrari, replaced Carlos Sainz and outperformed seasoned drivers like Lando Norris and Lewis Hamilton. Teammate Charles Leclerc and Ferrari boss Fred Vasseur lauded his performance, highlighting his talent and composure. Bearman expressed satisfaction with his performance, attributing part of his success to the fast car and clean race execution.

British teenager Oliver Bearman made a historic debut for Ferrari at the Saudi Arabian Grand Prix, finishing seventh and earning the Driver of the Day accolade. Bearman, standing in for Carlos Sainz, received widespread praise from fellow drivers and Ferrari's team boss Fred Vasseur for his impressive performance and composure. The 18-year-old's debut was marked by his ability to hold off seasoned drivers like Lando Norris and Lewis Hamilton, showcasing his potential as a future star in Formula One.

British teenager Oliver Bearman made a historic debut for Ferrari at the Saudi Arabian Grand Prix, finishing seventh and earning widespread praise. At 18 years and 305 days, he became Ferrari's youngest rookie, standing in for Carlos Sainz. Bearman impressed by finishing ahead of notable drivers like Lando Norris and Lewis Hamilton. Ferrari teammate Charles Leclerc and other F1 figures lauded his talent and potential. Ferrari boss Fred Vasseur commended Bearman's flawless performance, highlighting his calmness and solid feedback. Bearman expressed satisfaction with his performance, noting the advantage of a fast car and his goal to make a strong impression.

British teenager Oliver Bearman made a historic debut for Ferrari at the Saudi Arabian Grand Prix, finishing seventh and earning widespread praise. Bearman, the youngest rookie for Ferrari, replaced Carlos Sainz and impressed with his performance, keeping notable drivers like Lando Norris and Lewis Hamilton behind him. Ferrari teammate Charles Leclerc and other drivers, including Hamilton and Norris, commended Bearman's talent and potential. Ferrari boss Fred Vasseur highlighted Bearman's solid performance and calm demeanor. Bearman expressed satisfaction with his debut, noting the advantage of a fast car and his clean race execution.

Mercedes team boss Toto Wolff expressed a strong interest in having Red Bull's triple world champion Max Verstappen drive for them, contingent on improving their car's performance. Despite Verstappen's contract with Red Bull until 2028, Wolff remains optimistic about future possibilities. The article also touches on the strained relations between Verstappen's father, Jos, and Red Bull principal Christian Horner, who was recently cleared of allegations. Current Mercedes drivers Lewis Hamilton and George Russell's performances and frustrations with the car are also highlighted.

British teenager Oliver Bearman made a historic debut for Ferrari at the Saudi Arabian Grand Prix, finishing seventh and earning widespread praise. Bearman, the youngest rookie for Ferrari, replaced Carlos Sainz and impressed seasoned drivers like Lando Norris and Lewis Hamilton. Ferrari teammate Charles Leclerc and team boss Fred Vasseur commended Bearman's performance, highlighting his talent and potential for a future in Formula One.

British teenager Oliver Bearman made a historic debut for Ferrari at the Saudi Arabian Grand Prix, finishing seventh and earning widespread praise. At 18 years and 305 days old, he became Ferrari's youngest rookie, standing in for Carlos Sainz. Bearman impressed by holding off seasoned drivers like Lando Norris and Lewis Hamilton. Ferrari teammate Charles Leclerc and other notable figures in the sport, including Hamilton and Norris, commended his talent and potential. Ferrari boss Fred Vasseur highlighted Bearman's flawless performance and composure. Bearman expressed satisfaction with his performance, noting the advantage of a fast car and his goal to make a strong impression.

Saudi Arabia's Minister of Commerce, Majid Al-Kasabi, clarified at the World Economic Forum in Davos that the kingdom has not officially joined the BRICs bloc of developing countries, despite an invitation. This comes after conflicting reports and amidst rising geopolitical tensions between the U.S. and China, with Saudi Arabia seeking to pursue its own path in light of perceived reduced U.S. commitment to Gulf security.

Saudi Arabia's mandate for foreign firms to establish regional headquarters in the kingdom to qualify for government contracts is now in effect, with exceptions for contracts under 1 million riyals, those executed outside Saudi Arabia, deals with sole providers, and emergencies requiring a foreign company without a regional base. Companies can still compete for tenders but must be technically superior and 25% cheaper than the next best offer or have no competition. The Saudi cabinet approved contracting regulations without detailing the number of sub-1 million riyal contracts a foreign firm could sign. Tax incentives were announced shortly before the deadline, and 180 companies have agreed to establish headquarters in Riyadh, as part of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's efforts to diversify the economy away from oil and compete with the UAE for foreign investment.

The National Resistance Museum in Western Sahara documents the ongoing 50-year conflict between the Sahrawi people and Morocco. The museum showcases captured Moroccan weapons and serves as a testament to the Sahrawi struggle for independence. The Sahrawis, indigenous to the region, face Moroccan occupation of 80% of their territory, with the remaining 20% controlled by the Polisario Front. Despite a nonbinding International Court of Justice ruling favoring a referendum for Sahrawi self-determination, Morocco has fortified its presence with a 1,700-mile sand wall and continues to relocate Moroccans to the area. The Polisario Front, which began as an independence movement against Spanish colonialism, has been fighting for control since 1973. The conflict has seen shifts in power, with Morocco building defensive walls in the 1980s and a ceasefire in 1991 that has since ended. The museum not only preserves the history of the conflict but also collects evidence of the current war, including recent drone strikes by Morocco, which remains unrecognized by the Moroccan government.

Saudi Arabia is notably absent from the U.S.-announced naval coalition in the Red Sea, aimed at protecting shipping from Yemen's Houthi group. Despite its military capabilities and the war against the Houthis, Saudi Arabia's main concern is not to undermine its long-term goals of detente with Iran and peace in Yemen. The Houthis have been targeting Red Sea shipping in response to Israel's conflict with Hamas in Gaza, affecting global trade and threatening to involve U.S. naval vessels. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are seeking to avoid escalating tensions with Iran and jeopardizing peace efforts in Yemen. Both countries are reorienting their regional policy, including establishing ties with Israel and settling rivalries with Iran. The recent detente between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and the UAE's diplomatic relations with Israel, are significant steps in this process. However, the conflict in Gaza has strained these relationships and complicated the regional strategy. Saudi Arabia and the UAE's absence from the coalition may also reflect their need for security in the Red Sea and reliance on the U.S. security umbrella.

Saudi Arabia's absence from the U.S.-led naval coalition in the Red Sea is attributed to its strategic goal of detente with Iran and ending the war in Yemen. Despite having a U.S.-equipped military and being affected by Houthi attacks, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are avoiding participation to not escalate tensions with Iran or jeopardize peace efforts in Yemen. The Houthi group has been targeting Red Sea shipping, complicating global trade and threatening to expand attacks to U.S. naval vessels. Saudi Arabia and the UAE's regional strategy includes building new cities and hosting global events like the 2034 World Cup. The recent conflict between Israel and Hamas in Gaza has affected Saudi and Emirati relations with Israel and the U.S. Iran, supporting the 'Axis of Resistance' including the Houthis, criticizes any country joining the U.S. coalition. Despite the reluctance, Saudi Arabia's need for Red Sea security and reliance on the U.S. security umbrella persists.

Saudi Arabia's absence from the U.S.-announced naval coalition in the Red Sea is attributed to its strategic goal of ending the war in Yemen and improving relations with Iran. Despite having a U.S.-equipped military and being affected by Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are avoiding participation that could escalate tensions with Iran or jeopardize peace efforts in Yemen. The Houthi group, backed by Iran, has been targeting ships in response to Israel's conflict with Hamas. The regional strategy of Saudi Arabia and the UAE includes building new cities, hosting the 2034 World Cup, and reorienting policy with new partners and settling rivalries. The U.S. remains Saudi Arabia's most important ally, and both countries are part of a U.S.-led maritime force, though the UAE announced its departure.

Saudi Arabia is notably absent from a U.S.-announced naval coalition aimed at protecting Red Sea shipping from Yemen's Houthi group, despite its military capabilities and reliance on Red Sea ports. This absence is attributed to Saudi Arabia's strategic goal to disengage from the Yemen war and improve relations with Iran, the Houthis' main supporter. The Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping and threats to U.S. naval vessels have complicated global trade and raised tensions. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are seeking to avoid escalating tensions with Iran and jeopardizing peace efforts in Yemen. The article also discusses the broader regional strategy of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, including their desire to focus on domestic development and global affairs, as well as the impact of the conflict between Israel and Hamas in Gaza on their relations with Israel and the U.S.

Saudi Arabia is notably absent from the U.S.-announced naval coalition aimed at protecting Red Sea shipping from Yemen's Houthi group, despite its military capabilities and reliance on Red Sea ports. The kingdom's reluctance stems from a desire to not undermine its long-term goals of ending the war in Yemen and improving relations with Iran. The Houthis have been targeting ships in the Red Sea, which has impacted global trade and threatened to involve U.S. naval vessels. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are focusing on regional strategies, including a detente with Iran and peace with the Houthis, while managing their reputations and security concerns. The U.S. remains an important ally and military supplier to Saudi Arabia, which may suggest a behind-the-scenes role in Red Sea security.

Saudi Arabia is notably absent from the U.S.-announced naval coalition protecting Red Sea shipping from Yemen's Houthi group, despite its war on the Houthis and reliance on Red Sea ports. The absence is attributed to Saudi Arabia's strategic goal to disengage from the Yemen war and improve relations with Iran. The Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping and threats to U.S. naval vessels have complicated global trade and raised tensions. Saudi Arabia and the UAE's regional strategy includes building new cities, hosting the 2034 World Cup, and reorienting policy with new partners, including Israel. The recent war in Gaza has affected these plans, chilling Emirati ties with Israel and derailing Saudi-Israeli talks. Despite the reluctance to join the U.S. taskforce, Saudi Arabia's need for Red Sea security and reliance on the U.S. security umbrella persists.

Saudi Arabia is notably absent from the U.S.-announced naval coalition protecting Red Sea shipping from Yemen's Houthi group, despite its war on the Houthis and reliance on Red Sea ports. The absence is attributed to Saudi and UAE desires to avoid escalating tensions with Iran and jeopardizing peace efforts in Yemen. The Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping and threats to U.S. naval vessels follow Israel's conflict with Hamas in Gaza. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are reorienting their regional policy, including a detente with Iran and, for the UAE, normalized relations with Israel. The recent conflict has affected Saudi-Israeli normalization talks and Emirati ties with Israel. Iran, denying support for the Houthis, criticizes the Red Sea coalition. Despite the absence, the U.S. remains a key ally to Saudi Arabia, which may still play a behind-the-scenes role in Red Sea security.

Saudi Arabia's absence from the U.S.-led naval coalition in the Red Sea is driven by its strategic goal to end the war in Yemen and maintain detente with Iran. Despite its military capabilities and reliance on Red Sea ports, Saudi Arabia, along with the UAE, seeks to avoid escalating tensions with Iran or jeopardizing peace efforts in Yemen. The ongoing conflict in Gaza and regional dynamics have further complicated their stance. The U.S. remains a crucial ally, but Saudi Arabia's regional strategy focuses on long-term stability and development.

Saudi Arabia did not join the U.S.-announced naval coalition to protect Red Sea shipping from Yemen's Houthi group, despite its war on the Houthis and reliance on Red Sea ports. The decision aligns with Saudi's strategic goal to disengage from the Yemen war and improve relations with Iran. The Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping and threats to U.S. naval vessels have complicated global trade and raised tensions. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are reorienting their regional policy, including a detente with Iran and, for the UAE, normalized relations with Israel. The recent war in Gaza has affected these relations and Arab sentiment. Despite the absence from the coalition, Saudi Arabia and the UAE maintain a need for security in the Red Sea and ties with the U.S. for military support.

Saudi Arabia's absence from the U.S.-led naval coalition in the Red Sea is driven by its strategic goal to end the war in Yemen and maintain detente with Iran. Despite its military capabilities and reliance on Red Sea ports, Saudi Arabia, along with the UAE, avoids actions that could escalate tensions with Iran or disrupt peace efforts in Yemen. The ongoing conflict in Gaza and regional dynamics further complicate their positions. The U.S. remains a crucial ally, but Saudi Arabia and the UAE are cautious about public participation in the coalition to avoid regional backlash and maintain their long-term strategic goals.

Saudi Arabia is not participating in a new U.S.-led naval coalition to protect Red Sea shipping from Yemen's Houthi group, despite its military capabilities and reliance on Red Sea ports. This decision aligns with Saudi Arabia's strategic goal to disengage from the conflict in Yemen and improve relations with Iran. The Houthi attacks in the Red Sea are a response to Israel's conflict with Hamas in Gaza, which has also affected Saudi and Emirati relations with Israel and the U.S. Both Gulf states are reorienting their regional policies, including a recent detente with Iran and past diplomatic relations with Israel. Saudi Arabia aims to focus on domestic development and global engagement, while maintaining security in the Red Sea and its alliance with the U.S.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are notably absent from the U.S.-led naval coalition in the Red Sea, aiming to avoid escalating tensions with Iran and jeopardizing peace efforts in Yemen. Despite their significant military capabilities and reliance on Red Sea ports, both countries prioritize long-term regional strategies over immediate military involvement. The article highlights the broader geopolitical implications, including the impact of Israel's conflict with Hamas and the strategic realignments in the Middle East, particularly the Saudi-Iran detente and UAE-Israel relations.

Saudi Arabia is notably absent from the U.S.-announced naval coalition in the Red Sea, aimed at protecting shipping from Yemen's Houthi group. Despite its military capabilities and the impact of the Red Sea on its imports, Saudi Arabia, along with the UAE, is focusing on a long-term strategy to end the war in Yemen and improve relations with Iran. The Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping and threats to U.S. naval vessels are in response to Israel's conflict with Hamas in Gaza. The regional strategy also includes Saudi Arabia's ambition to host the 2034 World Cup and build new cities. The U.S. remains a key ally and military supplier to Saudi Arabia, despite their absence from the coalition.

Saudi Arabia's absence from the U.S.-led naval coalition in the Red Sea is driven by its strategic goal to avoid escalating tensions with Iran and to focus on ending the war in Yemen. The UAE shares this stance, aiming to prevent further regional instability. The article highlights the broader regional dynamics, including the impact of the Israel-Hamas conflict and the evolving relationships between Gulf states, Iran, and the U.S. Despite their absence from the coalition, Saudi Arabia and the UAE continue to navigate their complex geopolitical landscape, balancing security needs with long-term regional strategies.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are notably absent from the U.S.-led naval coalition in the Red Sea, primarily due to their strategic goal of reducing tensions with Iran and ending the conflict in Yemen. Despite their military capabilities and reliance on Red Sea ports, both nations are wary of actions that could escalate regional conflicts or undermine their long-term peace efforts. The article highlights the broader geopolitical implications, including the impact of the Israel-Hamas conflict and the complex dynamics of U.S. alliances in the region.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE have opted out of a U.S.-led naval coalition in the Red Sea, prioritizing their long-term strategy of regional detente with Iran and peace in Yemen over immediate military engagement. This decision reflects their desire to avoid escalating tensions with Iran and to focus on internal development and regional stability. The U.S. remains a crucial ally, but the Gulf states are cautious about openly participating in actions that could disrupt their strategic goals. The ongoing conflict in Gaza and its impact on regional dynamics further complicate their position.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are notably absent from the U.S.-led naval coalition aimed at protecting Red Sea shipping from Yemen's Houthi group, primarily due to their strategic goal of reducing regional tensions and avoiding further conflict with Iran. Despite their military capabilities and reliance on Red Sea ports, both nations are cautious about actions that could derail their long-term peace efforts in Yemen and their detente with Iran. The ongoing conflict in Gaza and its implications for regional stability further complicate their positions. The U.S. remains a crucial ally, but the Gulf states are wary of fully aligning with its initiatives that might provoke Iran or disrupt their regional strategies.

Saudi Arabia's absence from the U.S.-led naval coalition in the Red Sea is driven by its strategic goal to end the war in Yemen and maintain detente with Iran. Despite its military capabilities and reliance on Red Sea ports, Saudi Arabia, along with the UAE, seeks to avoid escalating tensions with Iran or jeopardizing peace efforts in Yemen. The Houthis' attacks on Red Sea shipping, linked to the Israel-Hamas conflict, complicate global trade and regional stability. The U.S. remains a crucial ally for Saudi Arabia, though the kingdom's reluctance to join the coalition reflects its broader regional strategy.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are notably absent from a U.S.-led naval coalition aimed at protecting Red Sea shipping from Yemen's Houthi group, reflecting their strategic focus on detente with Iran and peace in Yemen. Despite their military capabilities and reliance on Red Sea ports, both nations are wary of escalating tensions with Iran or jeopardizing regional peace efforts. The article highlights the broader geopolitical implications, including the impact of Israel's war in Gaza and the complex dynamics of U.S. alliances in the region.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are notably absent from the U.S.-led naval coalition in the Red Sea, primarily due to concerns about escalating tensions with Iran and derailing peace efforts in Yemen. Despite their significant military capabilities and reliance on Red Sea ports, both countries aim to avoid actions that could disrupt their long-term regional strategy, which includes detente with Iran and ending the war in Yemen. The U.S. remains a crucial ally, but the Gulf states are cautious about openly participating in actions that could provoke regional instability and Arab anger, especially in light of the ongoing conflict in Gaza.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are notably absent from the U.S.-led naval coalition aimed at protecting Red Sea shipping from Yemen's Houthi group, primarily due to their strategic goal of reducing regional tensions and avoiding further conflict with Iran. Despite their significant military capabilities and reliance on Red Sea ports, both nations are cautious about actions that could derail their long-term peace efforts in Yemen and their broader regional strategy. The article highlights the complex interplay of regional politics, including the impact of the Israel-Hamas conflict, and the delicate balance Saudi Arabia and the UAE are trying to maintain between their security needs and diplomatic ambitions.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE have opted out of a U.S.-led naval coalition in the Red Sea, prioritizing their long-term strategy of regional detente with Iran and peace in Yemen over immediate military involvement. This decision reflects their desire to avoid escalating tensions with Iran and to focus on internal development and regional stability. The U.S. remains a crucial ally, but the Gulf states are cautious about public participation in actions that could disrupt their strategic goals. The ongoing conflict in Gaza and regional dynamics continue to influence their geopolitical decisions.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are notably absent from a U.S.-announced naval coalition aimed at protecting Red Sea shipping from Yemen's Houthi group. Despite their military capabilities and the impact of the Red Sea on their imports, both countries are avoiding participation to not undermine their long-term regional strategies, which include detente with Iran and resolving the conflict in Yemen. The Houthi attacks in the Red Sea are a response to Israel's conflict with Hamas in Gaza, and while they have complicated global trade, their direct impact on Israel is unclear. The Gulf states' absence from the naval action is seen as a move to prevent escalation with Iran and to maintain peace efforts in Yemen. Saudi Arabia and the UAE's broader regional strategy involves building new cities, hosting global events like the World Cup, and reorienting their foreign policies, including establishing relations with Israel and settling rivalries with Iran.

Saudi Arabia is not participating in the new U.S.-led naval coalition in the Red Sea, aiming to protect shipping from Yemen's Houthi group, to avoid undermining its long-term strategic goals. These include ending the war in Yemen, reconciling with Iran, and focusing on domestic development projects like building new cities and hosting the 2034 World Cup. The Houthis have been attacking ships in the Red Sea, which has complicated global trade and threatened U.S. naval vessels. The U.S. has not explicitly stated that Saudi Arabia and the UAE will not join the coalition, and the countries' governments have not commented. Saudi Arabia and the UAE's absence from the coalition is seen as a move to avoid escalating tensions with Iran and jeopardizing peace efforts in Yemen. Despite differences over Middle East policy, the U.S. remains a crucial ally and military supplier to Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are notably absent from the U.S.-led naval coalition in the Red Sea, primarily to avoid escalating tensions with Iran and jeopardizing peace efforts in Yemen. The Houthis' attacks on Red Sea shipping, linked to the Israel-Hamas conflict, complicate global trade and regional stability. Despite their absence, both Gulf states remain strategically aligned with the U.S., balancing their regional ambitions with security needs. The article highlights the broader geopolitical implications, including the impact on Saudi-Israeli normalization and regional alliances.

Saudi Arabia's absence from the U.S.-led naval coalition in the Red Sea is driven by its strategic goal to end the war in Yemen and maintain detente with Iran. Despite its military capabilities and reliance on Red Sea ports, Saudi Arabia, along with the UAE, seeks to avoid escalating tensions with Iran or jeopardizing peace efforts in Yemen. The ongoing conflict in Gaza and regional dynamics have further complicated their positions, with both countries wary of being seen as aligning too closely with U.S. policies that could provoke Arab anger. The U.S. remains a crucial ally, but Saudi Arabia and the UAE are cautious about public participation in the coalition.

Saudi Arabia's absence from the U.S.-led naval coalition in the Red Sea is driven by its strategic goal to end the war in Yemen and maintain detente with Iran. Despite its military capabilities and reliance on Red Sea ports, Saudi Arabia, along with the UAE, seeks to avoid escalating tensions with Iran or jeopardizing peace efforts in Yemen. The ongoing conflict in Gaza and the broader regional dynamics, including the Saudi-Iran detente and UAE-Israel relations, influence their cautious stance. The U.S. remains a crucial ally, but Saudi Arabia and the UAE are reorienting their regional policies to balance security needs and long-term strategic goals.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are notably absent from the U.S.-led naval coalition aimed at protecting Red Sea shipping from Yemen's Houthi group, reflecting their strategic focus on detente with Iran and peace in Yemen. Despite their military capabilities and reliance on Red Sea ports, both countries are wary of escalating tensions with Iran or jeopardizing regional peace efforts. The U.S. remains a crucial ally, but Saudi and Emirati leaders are cautious about openly participating in actions that could provoke regional instability or Arab anger over Gaza. The article highlights the delicate balance these Gulf states maintain between security needs and long-term regional strategies.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE have opted not to join the U.S.-led naval coalition in the Red Sea, aiming to avoid escalating tensions with Iran and jeopardizing peace efforts in Yemen. This decision aligns with their broader strategy of regional detente and reducing involvement in conflicts. The Houthis' attacks on Red Sea shipping, linked to the Israel-Hamas conflict, complicate global trade and regional stability. Despite the U.S. being a key ally, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are cautious about public participation in the coalition, balancing their need for security with long-term regional goals.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are notably absent from the U.S.-led naval coalition in the Red Sea, aiming to avoid escalating tensions with Iran and jeopardizing peace efforts in Yemen. The article discusses the strategic reasons behind their decision, including the desire to end the war in Yemen and maintain regional stability. The U.S. remains a crucial ally for Saudi Arabia, despite some disagreements over Middle East policy. The article also touches on the broader geopolitical implications of the Israel-Hamas conflict and the regional dynamics involving Iran and the Houthi group.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are notably absent from the U.S.-led naval coalition aimed at protecting Red Sea shipping from Yemen's Houthi group, primarily due to their strategic goal of reducing regional tensions and focusing on long-term peace with Iran and the Houthis. Despite their absence, both countries remain cautious about escalating tensions and are balancing their need for security with their broader regional strategy. The U.S. remains a crucial ally, though there are underlying disagreements on Middle East policy. The article highlights the complex interplay of regional politics, security concerns, and international alliances.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE have opted not to join a U.S.-led naval coalition in the Red Sea, aiming to avoid escalating tensions with Iran and jeopardizing peace efforts in Yemen. This decision aligns with their broader strategy of regional detente and reorientation of foreign policy, despite the ongoing conflict involving the Houthis and the broader geopolitical implications of Israel's war with Hamas. The U.S. remains a crucial ally for Saudi Arabia, though the Gulf states' reluctance to publicly participate in the coalition reflects their complex regional priorities.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE have opted not to join a U.S.-led naval coalition in the Red Sea, aiming to avoid escalating tensions with Iran and jeopardizing peace efforts in Yemen. This decision aligns with their broader strategy of regional detente and reorientation of foreign policy, despite the ongoing conflict in Gaza and its implications. The U.S. remains a crucial ally for Saudi Arabia, though the kingdom's reluctance to publicly support the taskforce reflects its complex geopolitical considerations.

Saudi Arabia is notably absent from a U.S.-announced naval coalition in the Red Sea aimed at protecting shipping from Yemen's Houthi group. Despite its military capabilities and the impact of the Red Sea on its imports, Saudi Arabia, along with the UAE, is avoiding participation to not undermine its long-term goals of ending the war in Yemen and improving relations with Iran. The Houthi attacks in the Red Sea are a response to Israel's conflict with Hamas in Gaza, which has also affected Saudi and Emirati relations with Israel and the U.S. Both Gulf states are seeking to reorient their regional policy, including establishing diplomatic relations with Israel and a detente with Iran. The U.S. remains an important ally to Saudi Arabia, but the kingdom's reluctance to join the Red Sea taskforce reflects its need to balance regional strategy with security needs.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE have opted not to join a new U.S.-led naval coalition in the Red Sea, aiming to avoid escalating tensions with Iran and jeopardizing peace efforts in Yemen. This decision aligns with their broader strategy of regional detente and reducing involvement in conflicts. The ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas has further complicated regional dynamics, affecting Saudi and Emirati relations with Israel and the U.S. Despite their absence from the coalition, both countries remain key U.S. allies, with Saudi Arabia continuing to rely on U.S. security support.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are notably absent from the U.S.-led naval coalition in the Red Sea, primarily due to their strategic focus on resolving regional conflicts, particularly with Iran and the Houthis in Yemen. Despite their military capabilities and reliance on Red Sea ports, both nations aim to avoid escalating tensions and jeopardizing peace efforts. The article highlights the broader regional strategy of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, including their diplomatic moves with Iran and Israel, and the impact of the Gaza conflict on their policies. The U.S. remains a crucial ally, though there are underlying tensions and strategic recalibrations.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are notably absent from the U.S.-led naval coalition aimed at protecting Red Sea shipping from Yemen's Houthi group, reflecting their strategic focus on detente with Iran and peace in Yemen. Despite their military capabilities and reliance on Red Sea ports, both countries are wary of escalating tensions with Iran or jeopardizing regional peace efforts. The article highlights the broader geopolitical implications, including the impact of Israel's war in Gaza and the complex dynamics of U.S. alliances in the region.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are notably absent from the U.S.-led naval coalition in the Red Sea, aiming to avoid escalating tensions with Iran and jeopardizing peace efforts in Yemen. Despite their significant military capabilities and reliance on Red Sea ports, both countries prioritize long-term regional strategies over immediate military involvement. The article highlights the broader geopolitical context, including the impact of Israel's war in Gaza, the strategic realignment of Gulf states, and the ongoing influence of Iran and the Houthi group in Yemen. The U.S. remains a crucial ally for Saudi Arabia, though the Gulf states' reluctance to join the taskforce reflects their cautious approach to regional stability and security.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are notably absent from the U.S.-led naval coalition in the Red Sea, aiming to avoid escalating tensions with Iran and jeopardizing peace efforts in Yemen. Despite their significant military capabilities and reliance on Red Sea ports, both countries prioritize long-term regional strategies over immediate military involvement. The article highlights the broader geopolitical implications, including the impact of Israel's conflict with Hamas and the strategic realignments in the Middle East, emphasizing the delicate balance Saudi Arabia and the UAE seek to maintain in their foreign policies.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are notably absent from the U.S.-led naval coalition in the Red Sea, primarily due to their strategic focus on detente with Iran and peace in Yemen. Despite their significant military capabilities and reliance on Red Sea ports, both countries aim to avoid escalating tensions with Iran or jeopardizing regional peace efforts. The ongoing conflict in Gaza and the broader geopolitical landscape have further complicated their positions. The U.S. remains a crucial ally, but the Gulf states are cautious about overt participation in actions that could disrupt their long-term regional strategies.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are notably absent from the U.S.-led naval coalition in the Red Sea, aiming to avoid escalating tensions with Iran and jeopardizing peace efforts in Yemen. Despite their military capabilities and reliance on Red Sea ports, both countries prioritize long-term regional strategies over immediate military involvement. The article highlights the broader geopolitical context, including the impact of Israel's war in Gaza, the strategic realignment of Gulf states, and the complex interplay of regional and international alliances.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are notably absent from the U.S.-led naval coalition aimed at protecting Red Sea shipping from Yemen's Houthi group, primarily to avoid escalating tensions with Iran and jeopardizing peace efforts in Yemen. The article discusses the strategic importance of maintaining regional stability and the long-term goals of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, including their detente with Iran and ambitions for regional development. The U.S. remains a crucial ally, though there are underlying disagreements over Middle East policy.

Saudi Arabia's new civil code, part of the Vision 2030 reform plan, aims to attract foreign investment by providing legal clarity and reducing the discretion judges have in commercial disputes. The new laws, which follow sharia principles but are based on Egypt's 1849 civil law, are expected to boost investor confidence by offering more predictable legal outcomes. However, some investors remain cautious, preferring jurisdictions with established legal frameworks. The new code allows for clearer shareholder agreements, fixed damages in contracts, and the ability to sue for loss of profit, but doubts linger about the treatment of foreign parties in Saudi courts.

Saudi Arabia's annual inflation rate increased to 1.7% in November from 1.6% in October, driven primarily by a 9.4% rise in housing rents and a 1.4% increase in food and beverage prices. Despite the slight rise, inflation remains relatively low compared to global levels and has been easing since May. The government forecasts inflation at 2.6% for 2023 and 2.2% for 2024.

Lucid Group has assembled nearly 800 cars at its Saudi Arabian factory since its opening, focusing on training over 200 local employees. The factory, which opened in September, has an initial capacity to produce 5,000 EVs annually. The Saudi government has pledged to purchase up to 100,000 vehicles over ten years. The factory currently re-assembles cars shipped from Arizona and is preparing for a complete build unit by 2026. The Public Investment Fund, owning over 60% of Lucid, has invested billions as part of Saudi Arabia's plan to establish an EV industry hub.

Lucid Group has assembled nearly 800 cars at its Saudi Arabian factory since its opening, focusing on training over 200 local employees. The factory, which opened in September, has an initial capacity to produce 5,000 EVs annually. The Saudi government has pledged to buy up to 100,000 vehicles over 10 years. The factory currently re-assembles cars shipped from Arizona and is preparing for a complete build unit (CBU) by 2026. The Public Investment Fund, owning over 60% of Lucid, has invested billions as part of Saudi Arabia's plan to establish an EV industry hub. Lucid aims to encourage key parts suppliers to establish a presence in the kingdom.

Lucid Group has assembled nearly 800 cars at its Saudi Arabian factory since its opening, focusing on training over 200 local employees. The factory, which opened in September, has an initial capacity to produce 5,000 EVs annually. The Saudi government has pledged to purchase up to 100,000 vehicles over ten years. The factory currently reassembles cars shipped from Arizona and aims to prepare staff for a complete build unit by 2026. The Public Investment Fund, owning over 60% of Lucid, has invested billions as part of Saudi Arabia's plan to establish an EV industry hub.

Lucid Group has assembled nearly 800 cars at its Saudi Arabian factory since its opening, focusing on training over 200 local employees. The factory, which reassembles cars shipped from Arizona, aims to prepare staff for a complete build unit (CBU) factory set to open in 2026. The Saudi government, through its Public Investment Fund, holds a significant stake in Lucid and has committed to purchasing up to 100,000 vehicles over ten years. Lucid's strategy includes encouraging key parts suppliers to establish a presence in Saudi Arabia to enhance operational efficiency.

Lucid Group has assembled nearly 800 cars at its Saudi Arabian factory since its opening, focusing on training over 200 local employees. The factory, which opened in September, has an initial capacity to produce 5,000 EVs annually. The Saudi government has pledged to buy up to 100,000 vehicles over ten years. The factory currently re-assembles cars shipped from Arizona and is preparing for a complete build unit (CBU) factory by 2026. The Public Investment Fund, owning over 60% of Lucid, has invested billions in the company. Lucid aims to encourage key parts suppliers to establish a presence in Saudi Arabia.

Lucid Group has assembled nearly 800 cars at its Saudi Arabian factory since its opening, focusing on training over 200 local employees. The factory, which reassembles cars shipped from Arizona, aims to produce 5,000 EVs annually. Saudi Arabia's Public Investment Fund, holding a 60% stake in Lucid, has invested billions as part of the government's EV industry hub plans. Lucid, which has recorded significant losses, is preparing for a complete build unit factory by 2026, contingent on supply chains and workforce development.

Lucid Group has assembled nearly 800 cars at its Saudi Arabian factory since its opening, focusing on training over 200 local employees. The factory, which opened in September, has an initial capacity to produce 5,000 EVs annually. The Saudi government has pledged to purchase up to 100,000 vehicles over ten years. The factory currently re-assembles cars shipped from Arizona and is preparing for a complete build unit (CBU) factory by 2026. The Public Investment Fund, owning over 60% of Lucid, has invested billions as part of Saudi Arabia's plan to establish an EV industry hub.

Lucid Group has assembled nearly 800 cars at its Saudi Arabian factory since its opening, focusing on training over 200 local employees. The factory, which opened in September, has an initial capacity to produce 5,000 EVs annually. The Saudi government has pledged to purchase up to 100,000 vehicles over ten years. The factory currently re-assembles cars shipped from Arizona and is preparing for a complete build unit by 2026. The Public Investment Fund, holding a 60% stake in Lucid, has invested billions as part of Saudi Arabia's plan to establish an EV industry hub.

Lucid Group has assembled nearly 800 cars at its Saudi Arabian factory, focusing on training over 200 local employees. The plant, Lucid's first outside the U.S., was opened after Saudi Arabia committed to purchasing up to 100,000 vehicles over 10 years. The Saudi Public Investment Fund, owning over 60% of Lucid, has invested billions into the company. Lucid has been operating at a loss, with a $9.5-billion deficit as of September. The company is taking a gradual approach to training, with plans to open a complete build unit factory in 2026, contingent on supply chain and workforce development.

Lucid Group has assembled nearly 800 cars at its Saudi Arabian factory since its opening, focusing on training over 200 local employees. The factory, which opened in September, has an initial capacity to produce 5,000 EVs annually. The Saudi government has pledged to purchase up to 100,000 vehicles over ten years. The factory currently reassembles cars shipped from Arizona and is preparing for a complete build unit by 2026. The Public Investment Fund, owning over 60% of Lucid, has invested billions as part of Saudi Arabia's plan to establish an EV industry hub.

Lucid Group has assembled almost 800 cars at its Saudi Arabian factory, focusing on training over 200 local employees. The factory, Lucid's first outside the U.S., has an initial capacity of 5,000 EVs annually, supported by a Saudi government pledge to purchase up to 100,000 vehicles over 10 years. The Saudi Public Investment Fund, owning over 60% of Lucid, has invested billions in the company. Lucid has reported accumulated losses of $9.5 billion as of September. The company is preparing staff for a complete build unit factory set to open in 2026, with construction underway. The opening of the new factory depends on supply chains and workforce development.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE have opted not to join a U.S.-led naval coalition in the Red Sea, aiming to avoid escalating tensions with Iran and jeopardizing peace efforts in Yemen. This decision aligns with their broader strategy of regional detente and reorientation of foreign policy, including improved relations with Israel and Iran. The ongoing conflict in Gaza and its impact on regional dynamics have further complicated their stance. Despite their absence from the coalition, both countries remain key U.S. allies, with Saudi Arabia continuing to rely on U.S. security support.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are notably absent from a new U.S. naval coalition aimed at protecting Red Sea shipping from Yemen's Houthi group, primarily due to concerns about escalating tensions with Iran and jeopardizing peace efforts in Yemen. Both countries are focused on long-term regional strategies, including detente with Iran and ending the war in Yemen. The U.S. remains a crucial ally, but the Gulf states are cautious about openly participating in actions that could disrupt their strategic goals and provoke regional instability.

Saudi Arabia's new civil code, effective from December 16, aims to attract foreign investment by providing legal clarity and reducing the discretion judges have in commercial disputes. The reform is part of the Vision 2030 plan to diversify the economy away from oil. While the new laws are expected to boost investor confidence, there are lingering doubts about their practical application and the treatment of foreign investors. Legal experts and investors express cautious optimism, noting that the new framework should mitigate political risks and provide more predictable legal outcomes.

Saudi Arabia's new civil code, effective from December 16, aims to attract foreign investment by providing legal clarity and reducing the discretion judges have in commercial disputes. The reform is part of the Vision 2030 plan to diversify the economy away from oil. While the new laws are seen as a positive step towards creating a more predictable investment environment, there are still concerns about their practical application and the potential bias of Saudi courts. Investors like Imad Ghandour of CedarBridge Capital Partners are cautiously optimistic but await further evidence of the law's effectiveness.

Saudi Arabia's new civil code, part of the Vision 2030 reform plan, aims to attract foreign investment by providing legal clarity and reducing the discretion judges have in commercial disputes. While the new laws are expected to boost investor confidence, there is caution about their practical application. Key stakeholders, including private equity firms and legal experts, express optimism but also highlight the need for observing how the laws are implemented. The new framework is designed to protect investors better and make the legal environment more predictable, although some investors remain wary of potential biases in Saudi courts.

Saudi Arabia's foreign minister, Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, linked Houthi attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea to the ongoing war in Gaza, emphasizing the need for an immediate ceasefire. Speaking at the World Economic Forum in Davos, he highlighted the kingdom's priority of de-escalation through a ceasefire in Gaza.

Lucid Group has assembled nearly 800 cars in its Saudi Arabian factory since its opening, focusing on training over 200 local employees. The factory, which opened in September, has an initial capacity to produce 5,000 EVs annually. The Saudi government has pledged to buy up to 100,000 vehicles over 10 years. The factory currently re-assembles cars shipped from Arizona and is preparing for a complete build unit (CBU) factory by 2026. Saudi Arabia's Public Investment Fund, which owns over 60% of Lucid, has invested billions in the company. Lucid aims to encourage key parts suppliers to establish a presence in the kingdom.

The conflict in Western Sahara, a territory disputed between Morocco and the indigenous Sahrawi people, has reignited after a 29-year cease-fire. The Polisario Front, led by figures like Abwa Ali and Brahim Ghali, continues its struggle for independence against Moroccan forces, who are backed by the U.S. and Israel. The conflict has strained regional relations, particularly between Morocco and Algeria, and has drawn in international actors like the U.S., Israel, Spain, and France. The Sahrawi people remain determined in their fight, despite being outgunned and heavily reliant on Algerian support.

Unemployment for Saudi citizens increased marginally to 8.6% in Q3 from 8.3% in Q2, yet remained lower than the 9.9% from the same period the previous year. The overall unemployment rate, including foreign nationals, rose to 5.1%. Youth unemployment stood at 17.4%, with Saudi women's unemployment at 16.3%. The labour market participation rate for Saudi citizens dipped to 51.6%. These figures come amidst efforts by Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman's Vision 2030 programme to create jobs and reduce reliance on expatriate labour through the 'Saudization' initiative.

Saudi Arabia has not officially joined the BRICs bloc despite being invited, as confirmed by the kingdom's minister of commerce, Majid Al-Kasabi, at the World Economic Forum in Davos. This clarification follows earlier reports by Saudi state TV that were later retracted. The invitation to join BRICs, which includes Brazil, Russia, China, India, and South Africa, was extended to several countries, including Saudi Arabia, amid rising geopolitical tensions between the U.S. and China. Saudi Arabia's independent foreign policy reflects concerns over the U.S.'s commitment to Gulf security.

Saudi Arabia has not officially joined the BRICs bloc despite being invited, according to Commerce Minister Majid Al-Kasabi at the World Economic Forum. This clarification follows conflicting reports from Saudi state TV. The invitation to join BRICs, which includes Brazil, Russia, China, India, and South Africa, was extended to several countries, including Saudi Arabia, amid rising geopolitical tensions between the U.S. and China. Saudi Arabia's independent foreign policy reflects concerns over U.S. commitment to Gulf security.

The U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, expedited by the coronavirus pandemic, has created a security vacuum that the Islamic State and Iran are eager to exploit. The reduction in U.S. military presence has left large areas of the Iraqi desert unmonitored, raising concerns among local militias and Iraqi security forces about their ability to suppress ISIS resurgence. The situation is further complicated by ongoing tensions between the U.S. and Iran, with Iran-backed militias promising retaliation for the killing of Qassem Suleimani. The withdrawal has also sparked fears among ordinary Iraqis about increased Iranian influence and the potential for renewed conflict. Despite the U.S. military's confidence in the capabilities of Iraqi forces, the lack of coalition support, particularly in air support and intelligence gathering, poses significant challenges in combating the Islamic State's guerrilla tactics.

The assassination of Iranian Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani by a U.S. drone strike has shifted the political landscape in Iraq, potentially achieving in death what he could not in life: uniting Iraqis against U.S. presence and bolstering Iran's influence. The killing has provided legitimacy to Iraq's unpopular, Iran-aligned leadership, sidelining anti-government protests and fueling anti-American sentiment. The Iraqi parliament's nonbinding resolution to expel U.S. troops has created uncertainty, with fears of a power vacuum and resurgence of the Islamic State. The situation has complicated the protesters' demands for an independent Iraq, as they now face increased threats and accusations of being American spies.

The article details the ongoing protests in Iraq, highlighting the government's increasingly authoritarian response, including violence, arrests, and internet shutdowns. Protesters demand the end of the current regime and a complete overhaul of the governmental system established post-2003. The government's crackdown is legitimized through counterterrorism laws, with significant interference from Iranian forces. Despite the violence, protesters remain resolute, calling for systemic change and rejecting negotiations. The United Nations has called for reforms and an end to violence, but the situation remains tense with no resolution in sight.

Iraqi protesters, facing severe economic hardships and high youth unemployment, are demanding the removal of Iranian influence and the resignation of Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi, whom they see as an Iranian puppet. The protests have been marked by significant violence, with security forces using heavy tear gas canisters and live bullets, resulting in over 250 deaths. Iran, through its Quds Force and IRGC, is accused of coordinating the violence to maintain its influence in Iraq. Despite the bloodshed, protesters remain resolute in their demands for a complete overhaul of the governmental system.

Protests erupted in Baghdad on October 1, driven by widespread frustration with government corruption and inefficiency. Demonstrators, primarily young people, faced violent crackdowns from Iraqi armed forces, resulting in over 100 deaths and thousands of injuries. Protesters expressed a desire for a new form of government, even suggesting military rule. The Iraqi government, led by Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi, has been criticized for its failure to provide basic services and its ties to Iranian-backed militia groups. Despite the violent response, the root issues of corruption and lack of infrastructure remain, suggesting that protests may continue.

A recent drone strike killing two members of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) has heightened tensions in Iraq, with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu hinting at Israel's involvement. The PMF, linked to Iran, has been a significant force in Iraq, and the strikes threaten the stability of the Iraqi government led by Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi. The U.S. supports Israel's broader campaign against Iranian-backed groups in the region, complicating Iraq's efforts to maintain neutrality. The strikes have led to political instability and public discontent in Iraq, with concerns over foreign interference from both the U.S. and Iran. The situation is further complicated by the PMF's refusal to fully integrate into the Iraqi armed forces, despite government decrees. The ongoing conflict and foreign interventions pose a significant challenge to Iraq's sovereignty and stability.

Villagers in Abu Teban, Iraq, live in fear of nighttime attacks by the Islamic State, which is attempting to reestablish its insurgency in the region. Despite the fall of its last stronghold in Syria, ISIS militants have crossed into Iraq, operating in small cells and using tunnel networks. The Iraqi military, with U.S. support, has made significant strides in combating ISIS, but internal divisions among various armed factions, including the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service and the Popular Mobilization Forces, hinder overall effectiveness. The local population, once supportive of ISIS due to government neglect, now largely opposes the group after experiencing its brutality. However, the lack of government presence and basic services in remote areas continues to foster resentment, potentially allowing ISIS to regain influence. The article highlights the ongoing challenges in eradicating ISIS and the need for addressing the underlying social and political issues that contribute to its persistence.

The assassination of Alaa al-Mashzoub, a prolific Iraqi writer and critic, has cast a shadow over Baghdad's literary scene. Known for his fearless criticism of political and religious authorities, his death has left the literary community in shock and fear. The article explores the impact of his assassination on Iraq's cultural landscape, highlighting the ongoing threats faced by writers and intellectuals in the country. Despite the newfound freedom post-Saddam Hussein, the presence of red lines and the influence of militia groups continue to pose significant risks to those who speak out.

The article discusses the aftermath of a tragic boat sinking off the coast of Rashid, Egypt, which resulted in over 200 deaths. The boat was carrying migrants of various nationalities, including Egyptians, and the incident has highlighted the desperation of many young Egyptians trying to leave the country due to unemployment and poor living conditions. The local response to the disaster was primarily from fishermen, as the state's response was criticized for being almost non-existent. Survivors faced detention by police, and the UNHCR intervened to expedite the recognition of survivors as refugees. The article also touches on the broader issues of chronic unemployment, infrastructure problems, and the increasing number of Egyptians, particularly minors, attempting to cross the Mediterranean to Italy. Despite the risks, many young people still see Europe as their only chance for a better life, a sentiment echoed by the community organizer Walid Abdel Khalek.

Zeit Zatoun is a kitchen in Cairo founded by Tamara al-Rifai, which employs seven Syrian refugee women. The kitchen, which launched during Ramadan, has been busy with orders, serving dishes based on Rifai's family recipes. Rifai, a communications and advocacy specialist, started the initiative after meeting women at an Obour refugee center. The business aims to be sustainable through the quality of its food rather than relying on charity. It has faced challenges in balancing the community feel with professional discipline. Rifai plans to expand the menu seasonally and emphasizes the importance of presentation in Syrian cuisine. The article also touches on the broader aspects of Syrian and Levantine cuisine, highlighting the importance of fresh ingredients and the variety of dishes.

An Oromo asylum seeker died in Cairo after trying to help during a protest where two men set themselves on fire outside the UNHCR office. The protest was against the alleged discrimination of Oromo refugees by the UNHCR. The Oromo, Ethiopia's largest ethnic group, have faced a violent crackdown from the Ethiopian government, leading to deaths, injuries, and arrests. The UNHCR expressed regret over the incident but did not address the protest's cause. Oromo journalist Mohamed Ademo criticized the UNHCR's response, and Oromo community leaders claim widespread rejection of their refugee applications. They allege discrimination, particularly due to connections with the Oromo Liberation Front, labeled a terrorist group by Ethiopia. The UNHCR denies discrimination, attributing delays to individual case assessments and resource constraints. However, some sources suggest Syrian refugees receive priority due to funding and resource allocation, leading to despair among Oromo refugees, some of whom have died attempting to reach Europe.

The article discusses the alarming number of death sentences in Egypt, with over 1,000 people sentenced between 2014 and 2015. It highlights the mass death penalties issued by the Minya Criminal Court and the multiple sentences against Muslim Brotherhood Supreme Guide Mohamed Badie. The article notes that due to opaque court processes, only about half of these sentences have been upheld. Mada Masr, the source of the article, provides an infograph detailing the life cycle of a death sentence in Egypt and analyzes the spike in capital punishment since 2011. The research includes data from Cornell University Law School, Amnesty International's annual report, and Human Rights Watch, as well as Mada Masr's own archives.

The article discusses the Egyptian government's crackdown on the LGBT community following the release of a video that was interpreted as a gay marriage. Eight men were sentenced to three years in prison under a law criminalizing 'debauchery.' The article highlights the use of this law and other anti-pornography provisions to target LGBT individuals, often without substantial evidence. It also covers the invasive and criticized forensic anal exams conducted on arrested gay men. Activists like Scott Long and Ramy Youssef argue that these crackdowns are politically motivated to appease conservative factions and distract from other issues. The article mentions the use of technology by the government to surveil social media and warns LGBT individuals to be cautious. Despite the risks, Youssef and others continue to advocate for the LGBT community in Egypt, planning to publish a booklet of stories and dreaming of establishing a safe house for LGBT individuals.

The article discusses the crackdown on transgender women in Egypt, highlighting the arrests and mistreatment they face. Aisha, a transgender woman, was arrested and sentenced to three years in prison under Egypt's debauchery laws. The article notes that over 150 transgender individuals have been targeted since 2014. Activists like Scott Long and Yara, as well as Dalia Abdel Hameed from the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, provide insights into the challenges faced by the transgender community, including discrimination, health risks from unsupervised hormone use, and the difficulty of changing legal identity. The article also touches on the history of transgender identity in Egypt and the societal attitudes towards it. Despite the hardships, some prison guards have shown sympathy, recognizing transgender identity as a medical condition rather than a choice. The article concludes with personal accounts of transgender women contemplating leaving Egypt for more accepting societies.