Bill Emmott argues that Donald Trump appears unconcerned about the 2026 midterms because he believes he can continue governing through executive actions and personal control, regardless of which party controls Congress. The piece says Trump's limited legislative agenda has included a major budget bill and attempts to gain federal control over voting, while his broader focus has been accumulating power, enriching himself and his family, pursuing opponents, and using force and economic pressure abroad. A Democratic Congress could investigate him, constrain spending, and possibly impeach him, but the author sees meaningful accountability as unlikely without substantial Republican defections. Emmott concludes that Trump's presidency is primarily personal and power-driven rather than coherent or ideological, which may make a post-Trump United States less daunting, even as the coming years are likely to remain turbulent.

Armed opposition in Afghanistan has spread beyond its traditional northern strongholds, with groups claiming attacks across 26 provinces in August and September 2026. A Pashtun-led force headed by former Afghan general Sami Sadat is among the newer groups operating in areas associated with Taliban strength, though the resistance remains fragmented and lacks the capacity to seize major cities or threaten Taliban territorial control directly. The Taliban’s broken amnesty and documented abuses against former security personnel may be pushing trained fighters toward resistance networks. The country is not shown to be on the brink of civil war, but widening attacks, new groups and concurrent pressure from ISIS-K challenge the Taliban’s claim that control has delivered stability and warrant caution in US engagement.

India's planned Akash missile exports to Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, together with radar and maintenance support, offer the countries an alternative to Russian and Chinese suppliers and extend India's defense presence in Central Asia. China's J-10CE exports to Uzbekistan similarly expand its influence through arms sales and economic investment. Russia's arms exports have sharply contracted amid the war in Ukraine, prompting Central Asian governments to diversify partnerships, although trade, military commitments, and political ties preserve substantial Russian influence. The competition reflects India's effort to counter perceived Chinese encirclement and China's bid to deepen its regional position. Regional stability will depend on whether Central Asian states can use multiple defense partnerships to preserve autonomy without provoking conflict among their security partners.

The United States’ reliance on foreign financing could become more precarious if Japan, China and other Asian central banks stop buying or sell Treasury bonds in response to Trump’s tariffs, geopolitical policies and strained relations with creditors. Ray Dalio and Bill Gross warn that mounting public and corporate debt, alongside AI investment borrowing and war-related inflation, is intensifying risks in bond markets. Japan holds about $1.1 trillion in Treasuries and China about $618 billion, while Washington’s attempts to influence Japanese monetary policy and investment decisions have heightened tensions. A sharp retreat by Asian buyers could push yields higher and threaten broader financial-market instability, with few apparent buyers able to replace them.

The first US-Australian flight-test release of the Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM) marks technical progress toward a weapon the US Air Force hopes to field from 2027, with production targeted for 2029. The missile could give allied aircraft a fast standoff strike capability, including against time-sensitive targets in a conflict over Taiwan. But the article argues that its value depends less on speed than on whether allied forces can protect forward airbases and preserve targeting networks. Chinese missile forces, long-range aircraft, surveillance, and electronic warfare could threaten bases such as Tindall and disrupt the kill chains needed to guide weapons. Dispersed basing and alternative sites offer options but may be overwhelmed or slowed by Chinese strikes. The central conclusion is that the US and Australia must harden infrastructure and build resilient, cyber-redundant command and targeting systems for HACM to contribute credible deterrence.

China is invoking World War II history to portray Japan’s defense buildup and Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s Taiwan remarks as a return to militarism, while seeking to strain the US-Japan alliance. Xi Jinping’s Washington visit and wartime rhetoric appeared to advance that strategy, though analysts say entrenched security ties make a rupture unlikely. Takaichi’s longstanding rejection of Japan’s postwar apology statements has given Beijing an opening, and Chinese officials have used historical disputes in diplomacy and at the United Nations. The article places these moves in a longer pattern of China reshaping wartime memory to bolster claims to global leadership and pressure Japan, while warning that the United States under Donald Trump is an increasingly unreliable partner and that Japan may face growing isolation.

The US has capped and slowed licenses for aircraft parts bound for Comac, using China's dependence on Western aviation suppliers as leverage in negotiations over rare-earth exports. Chinese commentators see the greatest risk in a renewed cutoff of LEAP-1C engines for the C919, which could delay mass production, though such restrictions could also hurt Boeing by weakening its prospects in China's large aircraft market. China is developing the CJ-1000A as a domestic alternative, but certification, reliable mass production and approval for installation remain substantial hurdles; a full switch is considered unlikely before 2030. The US is also pursuing alternative mineral supply chains while pressing Beijing to restore rare-earth shipments.

Han Feizi argues that US “enshittification”—declining quality and affordability in goods and services—contrasts with China's “involution,” which the author reinterprets as intense competition driving better products, productivity and living standards. The piece attributes China's gains to long-term investment in education, infrastructure, automation and AI, citing rapid manufacturing output growth, robotics adoption, product improvements and environmental restoration. It acknowledges high youth unemployment and manufacturing job losses, but contends that young people have more opportunities and that productivity growth can create abundance if managed well. The author disputes claims that China's economy is stagnating or consumption is weak, arguing that supply-focused planning has coincided with strong household-consumption growth, and criticizes Western economies for failing to produce or invest enough to compete.

Indonesia has sharply increased defense spending and acquired a diverse range of aircraft, warships, submarines, missiles and drones. The buildup has expanded capabilities and reduced reliance on any single supplier, but the article argues that diverse equipment can also create problems integrating communications, data, training, maintenance and logistics. The commissioning of the former Italian carrier KRI Sriwijaya illustrates the difference between acquiring a platform and developing the people, procedures and support systems needed to operate it effectively. Indonesia's next phase of modernization will depend on interoperability, readiness, domestic technical expertise and the ability to fund equipment throughout its service life—not simply on the number of weapons purchased.

Taiwan has received its first two of 66 newly built F-16V Block 70 fighters, part of an $8 billion purchase intended to modernize its air force. The aircraft could reduce wear on Taiwan's existing fleet and help it respond to frequent Chinese air incursions, but they do not resolve the island's wartime vulnerabilities. China's growing J-20 fleet poses a major air-power challenge, while missile and rocket attacks could crater Taiwan's limited runways and trap fighters in hardened shelters. Taiwan's ability to sustain air operations in a conflict will therefore depend not on the F-16s alone, but on effective air defenses, dispersed unmanned systems, and rapid runway repair.